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This thesis is about American Protestant missionaries 
and their attempts to convert the Chinese to Christianity. 
American Protestants were not the first or only Christians 
to undertake this mission. Christianity appeared in China 
at least as early as the seventh century A.O. At that 
.time, Nestorian churches in Syria and Persia sent mission-
aries to India and China. Some converted small numbers of 
Chinese to their faith and established churches there. 
Nestorianism enjoyed the favor of Chinese emperors during 
the Tang dynasty <618-907), especially the Tai Zang emperor 
(626-649). Although Nestorian missions ended in the tenth 
century, Roman Catholic missionaries who went to China in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries found some Chinese 
practicing Nestorianism. Both Nestorians and Catholics 
lived in China during the Yuan dynasty (1264-1368), but 
under the persecution of the early Ming (1368-1644) 
Christianity virtually disappeared. 
Roman Catholic missions were more succ€ssful dL1ring 
the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The contri-
butions of the Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, were largely 
responsible for this success. Working in China from 1583 
until his death in 1610, Ricci established precedents in 
Catholic missionary work that continued into the twentieth 
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century. 
Ricci and the Jesuits tried to accommodate themselves 
as much as possible to the culture of China, even adopting 
the traditional dress of Chines~ scholars. They believed 
that concentrating their efforts on the educated elites was 
the best way to influence Chinese society. They used their 
technical and scientific knowledge as a way to gain the 
confidence of the Chinese scholars. Through these tech-
niques, the Jesuits became influential at the Imperial 
Court, especially with the Kangxi emperor <1661-1722> of 
the Qing dynasty <1644-1911). During the se~enteenth 
century, Franciscans and Dominicans from Spain and Jesuits 
from France joined the Italians in the China mission field. 
In the eighteenth century, controversies over the 
adaptation of Catholicism to Chinese culture divided the 
missionaries and resulted in the ~~spension of Christian 
missions until the nineteenth century. This dissension 
centered on the "rites" and "terms" issues. The rites 
controversy concerned the traditional Chinese practice of 
honoring Confucius and family ancestors. Ricci and other 
Jesuits considered these ceremonies to be non-religious and 
did not forbid converts to practice them. Other Catholics, 
including Pope Clement XI and Franciscan and Dominican 
missionaries, decided that ancestor "worship" was a pagan 
rite and opposed the practice. 
The terms controversy involved the question of what 
Chinese words should be adopted for "God." Several Chinese 
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terms had theistic connotations but none meant monotheism 
in the strict Judea-Christian definition of the concept. 
The missionary community was divided on which Chinese terms 
they should use. The Franciscans and Dominicans also 
differed from the Jesuits by emphasizing the conversion of 
the illiterate masses instead of the educated elites of 
Chinese society. Because of these controversies, the 
Catholics lost the imperial favor they enjoyed. In 1742 
Pope Benedict XIV sided with the Franciscans and Dominicans 
in the rites controversy. In response, the Qianlong 
emperor <1736-1796) issued an imperial edict declaring 
Christianity a seditious heterodoxy and the Catholics ended 
their missions until the nineteenth century. 
In 1807 the London Missionary Society became the first 
Protestant organization to send missionaries to China. 
Protestant ·missionaries suffered the same imperial disfavor 
as the Catholics until the 1840s; they also dealt with many 
of the same problems. The rites and terms questions became 
divisive issues among the Protestants and had no easy 
solutions. Protestant missionaries struggled with the 
adaptation of their religion to Chinese culture throughotJt 
their campaign to save China. Compounding the missionar-
ies' problems was the absence of monotheistic concepts in 
traMitional Chinese philosophy. The eclectic mixing of 
ideas from Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism, and Buddhism was 
another obstacle to converting the Chinese. The ethnncen-
trism of both the Chinese and the missionaries created 
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problems that resisted resolution. Missionaries of all 
faiths in all eras confronted these formidable barriers. 
American Protestants began their spiritual campaign to 
save China in 1830. Their efforts increased substantially 
after the Treaty of Tianjin between the United States and 
China in 1858. Although the campaign lasted more than a 
century and expended millions of dollars and thousands of 
lives, it was a failure. At no time during this period did 
more than one percent of the Chinese population espouse 
Christianity or practice a Christian lifestyle. The 
personal evangelisti~ style practiced by most missionaries 
for the first fifty years of the "Christian century" was 
especially ineffective in converting Chinese~ After 
adopting the techniques of the social gospel, American 
missionaries were more successful in winning Chinese for 
Christ but the numbers remained small. 
Liberal theology and the social gospel did, however, 
allow the missionaries to make progress in the secular 
areas of education and ~edical care. The goal of creating 
in China a reformed, modernized, Western democracy based on 
Christian ideals replaced the goal of making every Chinese 
a ChristiaM. Despite this altered approach, the mission-
aries failed to effect these evolutionary changes in the 
Chinese polity. Civil wars, foreign wars, and anarchic 
domestic political conditions greatly hampered the mission·· 
aries' efforts. There was no con~ensus among the Chinese 
on their social and economic problems and this factionalism 
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made the missionaries' task more difficult. After Mao 
Zedong and the Communists established the Peoples' Republic 
of China in 1949, American Protestants evacuated the 
mainland leaving behind the dream of a Christian China. 
The critical decade of the Christian century was 1919 
to 1928. The rapid development of Chinese nationalism, the 
manifested goals of that nationalism, and the missionaries' 
reactions to those goals determined the future of Chris-
tianity in China. During this short period, the missionar-
ies believed they had an opportunity to influence the 
outcome of China's struggle to become a modern state. 
Several issues of Chinese nationalism affected the mission-
ary enterprise. Government control of mission schools, 
Chinese Christian control of churches, Chinese forms of 
worship, and the renegotiation of international treaties 
were problems that involved the vested interests of Prates-
tant missions. There were no easy solutions to these 
problems. The missionaries' inability to successfully meet 
the challenge of these years of crisis is revealed in their 
responses to the issues of Chinese nationalism. 
Although they were limited by their theology and the 
cultural burden their religion carried, American Protes-
tants in China confronted alternatives and made choices 
that had consequences for themselves and their followers. 
Those choices influenced the Chinese decision tn reject 
Christianity as a viable solution to the dilemma of 
modernization. The missionaries' conservative approar-h to 
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the issues alienated many Chinese Christians and was an 
important reason for their failure. The missionaries could 
only accept evolutionary change in themselves, their 
missions, and their followers. 
revolution. 
China was in the midst of a 
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INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN PROTESTANTS 
AND THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, 
1858-1953 
Between 1858 and 1953, American P~otestants sent 
thousands of men and spent millions of dollars in their 
attempt to create Christian churches in China. This 
"Christian century" began after the Treaties of Tianjin·'· 
insured the missionaries the riqht to proselytize and 
convert Chinese to their religion. The "toleration 
clauses" of these treaties established American Christian 
workers as a privileged elite in Chinese society.e 
Although the United States finally relinquished these 
privileges in 1943, it was the Communists who effectively 
ended these conditions after they gained control of the 
mainland in 1949. 
After the Korean War and an intense anti-American 
movement began in 1950, even the most optimistic missionar-
ies left China. Foreign Christian workers were harassed, 
accused of being spies, and imprisoned.a By 1953 only ten 
American missionaries remained and eight of them were in 
prison. 4 The attempt to Christianize China ended in 
failure. At no time durinq this period did the number of 
1 
Chinese Christians reach one percent of th~ tot~l popula-
tion.~ As the missionaries fled the hostile Comm~nist 
regime, their converts remained behind to negotiate a 
modicum of toleration for themselves and their Western 
re.ligion.= 
2 
The Communist victory in 1949 marked the conclusion of 
two simultaneous, century-long struggles in East Asia. 
China's own struggle to break free from two thousand years 
of traditionalism and become a modern nation ended in 
totalitarianism. The campaign of American Protestants to 
Christianize China· ended in bitter frustration and the 
"loss of China." The failure of the missionaries to change 
this conclusion in ways they desired is the legacy of the 
Christian century. The 1920s were the determining years in 
both struggles to change China. During this period, the 
missionaries believed their opportunity to influence the 
outcome of China's struggle to become a modern state was 
greatest. Yet they alienated many of their own followers 
and virtually neglected the rural Chinese, the eventual 
source of power in the new China. The missionaries' 
responses to the issues of Chinese nationalism during this 
critical decade determined their fate when political pnwer 
and patriotism united against all Westerners after 1949. 
Study of the Christian century enlightens aspects of 
cultural confrontation that have relevance for East-West 
relations. Two decad~s of alienation between China and the 
United States after 1950 indicate that the failure to 
3 
respond successfully to Chinese nationalism was more than a 
missionary problem. While American Christian workers were 
in China, they served as a line of communication between 
the East and West--their failure is their most important 
message. 
Origins of the Protestant Campaign 
The first American missionaries arrived in China in 
1830. They worked under· constraints the Qing government 
imposed upon all foreigners until 1842 when some of the 
restrictions were lifted by the treaty settlement that 
ended the First Anglo-Chinese War. The missionaries did 
not, however, make many converts until the Second Anglo-
Chinese War forced the Empire to accommodate Westerners to 
a greater extent. 
After the Treaties of Tianjin "opened" China in 1858, 
American Protestants undertook a century-long campaign to 
convert the "heathens" of the Middle Kingdom. The evolu-
tion of the mission~ry enterprise during the Christian 
century was related to political and social changes in both 
the United States and Chi~a. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the attitudes and techniques of the 
missionaries changed in accordance with the "social 
gospel." Missions were big business; the denominational 
boards established million-dollar institutions in China. 
,.. 
These vested interests were threatened and then destroyed 
by the political forces that engulfe~ China after 1925. 
The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions <ABCFM> was the first American missionary society 
to send men to China. David Abeel and Elijah C. Bridgman 
arrived in Guangzhou <Canton> in 1830 where American and 
British merchants and other foreigners engaged in trade. 
Robert Morrison of the London Missionary Society preceded 
them as the first Protestant missionary to China in 1807. 
Bridgman, the first American missionary to learn Chinese, 
acquired a printing press in 1831. and began publishing the 
Chinese Repository in May 1832. This first missionary 
journal published in China set a precedent for Christians 
to report, comment, and editorialize on the events and 
conditions they confronted.7 
American missionaries worked in the China field under 
very restricted conditions before 1858. The Chinese custom 
of interacting with foreigners according to the stipula-
tions of the "tributary system" confined all Westerners to 
the single port of Guangzhou until after 1842.~ Before 
this date, imperial edicts prohibited Christian missionar-
ies from entering any part of China and also prohibited 
Chinese from becoming Christians. Missionaries violated 
Chinese law by going to Guangzho~ and posing a~ clerks in 
the merchants' factories. They hired Chinese to distribute 
their printed tracts in the surrounding areas. They also 
ventured away from the factory district whenever they had 
an opportunity to elude the local Chinese officials.• 
The treatie5 negotiated after the First Anglo-Chinese 
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War (1839-1842) opened four more Chinese cities to commerce 
and the residence of foreigners. Although Americans did 
not participate in the war, the United States negotiated a 
treaty with China similar to the Sino-British treaties of 
1842 and 1843. 10 This treaty allowed the missionaries to 
build churches in the "treaty ports" but did not grant the 
right to convert Chinese. The French envoy obtained this 
right when he persuaded the Imperial Court to issue edicts 
rescinding the prohibition against Chinese accepting Chris-
tianitv. 11 This war and the resulting treaties began the 
linkage between Western military power and the ability of 
Americans to proselytize in China. This. relationship be-
came a dilemma for succeeding generations of missionaries. 
Between 1842 and 1858 foreign Christian workers 
resided in the five treaty ports opened after the First 
Anglo-Chinese War. They could travel away from these 
cities only a one-day's distance and had to return each 
night. 12 The missionaries resented these restrictions and 
looked forward to the time when they could work permanently 
in the interior. 18 The fact that few Chinese accepted the 
Gospel before the 1860s reinforced the belief that the 
inability of the missionaries to move freely in China 
diminished their effectiveness. 14 
In the 1850s, missionaries believed God was preparina 
China for redemption. This affected their view of contem--
porary events: God was causing the violence and chaos that 
engulfed China during this period. The Taiping Rebellion 
(1850-186~> encouraged some Americans to bel.ieve the 
salvation of China was near. 1 ~ By the time the missionar-
ies realized the Taiping r~ligion was at best a pseudn-
Christianity and at worst a sync~etic cult, renewed 
military aggression by Western nations had attracted their 
at tent ion. J.e;. 
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The Second Anglo-Chinese War and the Treaties of 
Tianjin afforded foreign Christian workers the freedom they 
desired and established their el.ite position in China. The 
British began the war after the Arrow incident in 1856 and 
prosecuted it with their French allies for the sole purpose 
of obtaining commercial concessions from the Chinese~ 
Although the United States claimed neutrality and did not 
participate in the hostilities, the American Minister, John 
B. Reed, accompanied the Anglo-Fiench forces to Tianjin and 
negotiated a treaty. Samuel Wells Williams and W.A.P. 
Martin, two American missionaries, served as interpreters 
for Reed during the negotiations. They were instrumental 
in incorporating the "toleration clauses" into the Americ:an 
treaty with the defeated Chinese. 17 
The "unequal" Treaties of Tianjin solidified the rela-
tionship between Western military power and the mission-
aries' ability to proselytize in China. The settlement 
opened thirteen additional treaty ports, including several 
on the Chang Jiang <Yangtze River) in the interior. 
Foreigners, including missionaries, could now rent houses. 
estahlish businesses, and build houses and churches in 
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these cities. The toleration clauses allowed both foreign-
ers and Chinese to "quietly profess and teach" Christianity 
without persecution. 1 e 
The American treaty was similar to those negotiated 
with Great Britain, Russia, and France. It was the French 
treaty, however, that acquired the greatest freedom for the 
missionaries. Father Delamarre, acting as interpreter for 
the French, inserted in the Chinese text of the treaty the 
stipulation that the missionaries could buy and lease 
property outside the treaty ports. Although the official 
French text held precedenc~ over the Chinese text and did 
not include this, foreign Christian workers asserted that 
they now had the right to establish permanent missions in 
the interior. Western diplomats did not try to restrain 
the subsequent expansion of the missionaries outside the 
treaty ports. Confronted wjth the supremacy of Western 
military power, the Qing government had no recourse but to 
allow property transferral to the Christians.~• 
The American missionary effort expanded greatly after 
the Treaties of Tianjin created the "opened" conditions 
under the toleration clauses. Foreign Christian workers 
had no reservations about gunboats insuring their opportun-
ities to save China.~0 They called for reinforcements, 
bouqht property for churches and schools, and were general-
ly more successful in winning converts.an. Some were 
tentative about the ability of Christians to supply the 
necessary manpower, and this was a problem during the 
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American Civil War.22 But as American missionaries began 
their century-lonq attack on the "Gibraltar of Heathendom," 
they were confident they would reap ''a great harvest at no 
distant day. 11 i.=s 
The dramatic increase in missionary numbers after the 
Second Anglo-Chine~e War indicates the efficacy of the 
toleration clauses in providing a favorable environm~nt for 
evangelism. There were 81 Protestant missionaries repre-
senting 20 societies in China in 1858. This number in-
creased to 1,096 in 1889; 39 percent were Americans.~4 
Before 1842, only 56 Protestants had gbne to China, and 
between 1842 and 1857 only 142 more undertook the crusade. 
At the end of the century, a total of 2,388 had gen~. with 
the greatest increase coming between 1888 and 1897.~~ 
Larger numbers of missionaries dedicated their lives 
to service in China after 1900. In 1905 the number of 
foreign Christian workers rose to 3,445~ including 964 
unmarried women. 26 The movement accelerated into World War 
I and beyond with 6,164 in 1918, 7,820 in 1924, peakinq in 
1926 at 8,325.e7 After an evacuation of the missionaries 
in 1927, they slowly returned to their former level and by 
1930, 6,346 were working for 100 different societies. The 
number of Americans in 1930 was 3,052 which was 48 percent 
of the total .ec.i This level of "occupation" remained 
constant until the second missionary evacuation after 
1949. 11!1"? 
An increase in the number of Chinese Christians 
9 
corresponded to the growing missionary presence in China 
after 1858. Although missionaries had been active in the 
' treaty ports for over a decade, they had only 350 followers 
in 1853. Eleven years after the Treaties of Tianjin there 
were 5,753. This number more than doubled in the next 
eight years reaching 13,035 in 1876. 30 The missionaries' 
efforts to win converts were successful throughout the rest 
of the nineteenth century. The 1889 count revealed 37,287 
Chinese Christians. There were 85,000 converts in 1900, a 
127 percent increase in eleven years. 3 ~ 
After the turn of the century, the rate of increase in 
the numbers of Chinese who joined the Christian churches 
steadily diminished. Between 1900 and 1906 there was a 106 
percent increase which brought the reported number to 
178,251. From then until 1920, the missionaries averaged 
about 10 percent a year in additional converts; the 1920 
total was 366,524.~• In 1930 Protestant missionaries 
claimed approximately 750,000 Chinese were in some way 
associated with their churches but only 400,000 were actual 
members. Considering the years that had passed since 1858 
and the effnrts of the missionaries, these numbers are not 
impressive. 3~ 
Missionary Institutions 
Durinq the Christian century, the development of West-
ern institutions accompanied the expansion of the Prates--
tant churches in China. More missionaries and converts 
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meant more mission schools, mission hospitals, and mission 
presses. Although the number of Christians remained small, 
these facilities enabled them to have a disproportional 
effect upon Chinese society. 
Christian education was one of the most influential 
missionary activities. Popular education did not exis~ in 
traditional China. The Chinese gentry dominated the educa-
tional discipline which required ~elf-effacing dedication 
to the Confucian canon. The primary goal of becominq a 
government official through the civil service examination 
system motivated men to engage in this process.~4 Because 
early Protestant missionaries failed to conver~ the 
educated elite, their efforts turned to the illiterate 
masses.~~ The first Amerieans to occupy the treaty ports 
established schools for both boys and girls. To save the 
uneducated "heathen," the missionaries first taught them to 
read the Bible.~6 From this beginning, a complete mission 
education system developed that was alien to the indigenous 
Confucian tradition. 
The number of Chinese atteDding mission schools in-
/ 
creased rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century. 
In 1877, 5,917 Chinese of all ages were enrolled; in 1889 
this increased to 16,836. In 1911, 102,533 Chinese 
students attended mission schools. This increased rapidly 
to 169.707 only four years later.~7 One reason for this 
tremendous expansion was the increased demand for a Western 
curriculum after the abolition of the Confucian civil 
1 1 
service examination system in 1905. At that time. the Qinq 
government began its own system of popular education which 
tried to incorporate modern Western subjects. This reform 
movement forced the government to rely heavily on graduates 
from the mission schools for teachers with knowledge of 
modern subjects. Because the Christian schools already 
existed and taught these subjects, they benefitted from 
this development.so 
In the twentieth century, foreign Christian workers 
gave special attention to college education. Many mission-
aries received a humanistic college education in the United 
States before going to China and wanted to reproduce this 
experience for their followers. Motivated by this desire, 
they gradually expanded the curriculum of som~ middle 
schools to incorporate col.lege-level work. By 1890 there 
were four fully-developed ~hristian colleges with currictila 
that combined Western and Chinese subjects.~• 
American missionaries were especially dedicated to 
college education. With the expansion of their facilities 
from 1910 to 1924, higher Christian education in China 
virtually became their monopoly .• 40 ~ Although there were 
only 267 Chinese in Protestan~ colleges in 1910. this 
inrreased to 1,929 in 1920. This doubled in only four 
.. 
years when 3,901 students attended 17 schools. American 
missionary organizations operated 14 of the 17 Christian 
colleges. 4 ~ Although Chinese nationalism greatly affected 
the mission schools during the rest of the Christian 
12 
century, the level of attendance remained relativelv 
stable. By 1949 the missionaries had graduated over 50,000 
Chinese from their colleges. 4 m 
In conjunction with the emerging institutions of 
Christian education, missionaries also expanded their 
publishing facilities. By 1897 there were eleven mission 
presses producing Bibles, tracts, hymnals, and religious 
books, as well as text books for the mission schools. The 
most important of these was the American Presbyterian Press 
in Shanghai. 4~ Producing an adeqL1ate translation of the 
Bible was a primary goal for the Christians, and the 
American Bible Society made substantial contributions for 
revisinq earlier translatinns. 44 Some of these later 
translations adopted the Chinese vernacular and romaniza-
tion of characters in an effort to communicate with the 
uneducated millions. Between 1890 and 1921 the number of 
Christian periodicals the mission presses circulated 
increased from forty to one hundred seven. 4~ 
The missionary enterprise became big business as a 
result of this expansion of Christian facilities. In 1917 
the thirty largest American missionary societies raised $19 
million for their work in all foreign countries. This 
increased to $30 million in 1920. 46 By 1930 the American 
investment in the China mission field reached 3,000 
rni$Sionaries with a total annual budget of $7.7 mil1ion. 47 
These large expenditures created a materialistic interest 
in China that became a burden for the foreign Christian 
workers in the 1920s. Missionaries and their supporters 
hesitated to relinquish their control over these institu-
tions and their million-dollar budgets when Chinese 
Christians demanded mor~ involvement in their adminis-
tration. 
The Social. Gospel 
13 
A changing missionary theoloqy during the nineteenth 
century was responsible for the growing emphasis on Chris-
tian education, the use of published materials, and social 
reform programs. An evolution from a conservative, ex-
elusive theology to a more liberal, inclusive Christianity 
or "social gospel," greatly affected the China missions of 
American Protestants. 
The first Christian workers who went to China believed 
God condemned those "heathen" who died without the Gospel. 
Their mandate was to save individual Chinese through direct 
methods like street preaching and itineranting through the 
villages. Although the early missionaries built schools 
and hospitals, this was to attract more converts, not to 
benefit secular Chinese society. 48 
In the 1880s and 1890s, a religious revival in 
American Protestantism combined with progressive attitudes 
toward the social aspects of religion to produce the socjal 
gospe 1 . Americans took pride in democratic institutions, 
public schools, social reforms, and modernization. They 
turned outward both secularly and religfously, believinc 
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thev should share their faith in progress with the rest of 
the world. Preventing the eternal punishment of the "lost" 
no longer was the sole motivation for foreign missions. 
The regeneration of the world and the elevation of human 
society became the ultimate goal of religion. Saving 
individuals was still a means to an end, but a new "Chris--
tian" society spread throughout the world was to be the 
manifestation of success. 49 
The effects of the social gospel were especially 
prominent in China missions during the first two decades of 
the twentieth century. The missionaries believed "regener-
atinq" more individual Chinese would eventually "save" the 
nation. Their efforts changed from a direct evangelistic 
presentation of the Gospel to social reform, medical work. 
and education. By 1911 less than half of all missionaries 
were in evangelism. Many were administrators or educators 
in the Christian institutions required to implement the 
social gospel.~0 
These new ideas about conducting mission work had 
direct benefits for the Chinese. Foreign Christian workers 
started community movements against the social evils of 
gambling. opium use, alcohol. cigarettes, and prostitu--
tinn.t"H They worked on famine and flood relief and orga--
.• 
nized athletics for the young.l'5e Mission sc:hools for girls 
elevated the status of Chinese women through education. 
They also required their students to unbind their bound 
feet. 5~ Some missionaries helped find homes for abandoned 
children and orphans.~4 As industry developed in China, 
missionaries became concerned about economic issues and 
1~ 
tried to improve working conditions .. ~~ Through these types 
of activities; missionaries hoped to guide China into the 
modern world as a "Christian" nation. 
The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions 
<SVM> and the Young Men's Chri~tian Association <YMCA> were 
two important organizations involved in the social regen-
eration of China. American Protestants utilized both of 
these associations in their attempt to Christianize China 
after the turn of the century. Their development illus-
trates the dominant trends in China missions during this 
period. 
Foreign Christian workers began to organize the first 
YMCAs in mission school.s in the 1880s. By 1900 there were 
forty-seven associations in eight provinces and in 1901 one 
hundred seventy delegates attended a national convention in 
Shanghai. The desire to include Chinese in administration 
was a significant aspect of the YMCA. Three-fourths of the 
delegates at the 1901 conference were Chinese Christians. 
This trend con~inued into the 1920s when Chinese served as 
secretaries of local and national associations. The young 
me~ the YMCA carefully re~ruited from American college 
campuses were sensitive to the iss~es and conditions they 
confronted in China. As they expanded their activities 
from mission schools to Chinese government schools, the 




The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions 
was the recruiting mechanism for the YMCA as well as other 
denominational missionary societies. Initiated with the 
fervor of revivalism, the SVM grew from 100 "Volunteers" in 
1886 to an organization that had contributed 8,140 men anrl 
women to Protestant missions in 1919.57 Dwight L. Moody, 
founder of the SVM,. was largely responsible for creating 
the "crisis atmosphere" the movement thrived on.l'::rn;i "The 
Evangelization of the World in This Generation" became the 
SVM motto. Traveling secretaries visjted college campuses 
throughout the United States persuading recruits to sign 
pledg~ cards declaring they would become missionaries."9 
Beginning in 1891, the SVM held quadrennial international 
conventions that attracted an attendance of almost 4,000 in 
1909 • ,'!:>O 
The Volunteers were a highly educated elite who 
developed a new strategy of "republican" conversion. By 
con~erting young Chinese who were infatuated with the West, 
they hoped to develop Chinese Christian leadership capable 
of influencing the masses. This method also created a 
following the Westerners could interact with comfortably. 
Because they came from progressive American campuses, the 
men and women of the SVM influenced the trend towards 
identifying social regeneration as the goal for miss]nns. 
Their revival~born enthusiasm contributed to missionarv 
optimism that the churches could make beneficial chanqes in 
/ 
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China through Chinese Christian leadership.•~ 
Missionary Attitudes 
In the ranks of the SVM at the turn of the century 
were many of the missionaries who later contended with the 
problems of Chinese nationalism. Under the influence of 
the altered theology and goals that now directed missions, 
these men and women adopted diff~rent attitudes towards the 
people they were trying to save. Instead cif lost "hea-
then," the Chinese were potential "democrats." This change 
in missionary attitudes was an important aspect of the 
Christian century. 
The earliest Protestant~ in China displayed stronq 
paternalistic attitudes t~at operated from racist convic·-
tions. The missionaries came from rural areas strong in 
pietism and attended colleges in New York or New England. 
These men believed they were the instruments of God. 68 
When referr inq to the Chinese, they used the term "hea--
then," relegating their potential converts to a sub-human 
statu~. Ironically, the Chinese considered the Western 
intruders to be "American barbarians" or "foreign 
devils."<!,.;;:i" The early Christian effort was a "campaign" or 
"battle," and it required the "Society for the Diffusion of 
Cannon Balls" to overcome the "enemy."<!,.~+ 
Although many of the blatant racist remarks disap-
peared from missionary rhetorir. after 1900, paternalism 
remained an inherent part of Christianity in China. The 
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Chinese were a responsibility the Lord bestowed upon 
Americans to shepherd into His Kingdom and into the modern 
world. To effect this "flexible policy of paternalism." 
missionaries required their followers to give up ancestor 
worship and concubinage.•~ Western Christians also 
maintained a contemptuous attitude towards Chinese reli-
gions. The worship of "gods which are no gods" did not 
satisfy the Chinese soul the complete way the religion of 
Jesus c ou 1 d • .;;,c;; 
The ability of American missionaries to relate better 
to their converts increased substantially by the 1920s 
despite the intransigence of paternalism. Many missionar-
ies moderated their attitudes towards ancestor worship and 
other traditional Chinese ceremonies.~7 Westerners allowed 
Chinese Christians more participation in church administra-
tinn. The number of ordained Chinese increased from 764 in 
1915 to 1.305 in 1920, and to 2,196 in 1936.•e Chinese 
began to assume the majority at national Christian confer-
ences. 69 Some missionaries advocated giving their converts 
more freedom for self-development. 70 
These new attitudes were partially the result of 
pressure for more responsibility from the Chinese leader-
ship the missionaries had successfully developed. Ac; China 
entered the chaotic and decisive decade of the 1920s, the 
issues of church independence and the role of missionaries 
in the national life of China attracted more attention. 
Political events directly affecting the mission institu-
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tions forced American Protestants to reexamine their 
Heavenly commission to "save" China. By 1928 many of them 
fe~red Christianity had missed its opportunity in China.71 
This perception proved true when the missionary enterprise 
came to a close in the early 1950s. 
During the Christian century, missionaries benefitted 
from special privileges granted by the toleration clauses 
in the Treaties of Tianjin. A revival in American Prates-
tantism in the 1880s and 1890s reinforced their attempts to 
Christianize China. Younq Americans became determined to 
"Evangelize the World In This Generation." The social 
qospel and democratic ideals motivated missionaries to 
promote social reform and try to transform China into a 
"Christian" nation. National organizations like the YMCA 
and SVM channeled the American effort into institutions 
that required large administrative staffs and larger 
budgets.. Despite the limited success that accompanied 
these developments, American missionaries remained highly 
optimistic into the 1920s when they confronted their 
greatest challenge. 
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CHAPTER II 
ANTI-CHRISTIANITY AND CHINESE 
NATIONALISM 
American missionaries considered their efforts in 
China to be in the best interests of their potential 
followers. Yet some Chinese forcefully resisted the 
attempts of foreign Christian workers to convert them. 
Anti-Christianity during the Christian century was an 
extension of traditional Chinese anti-foreignism. Because 
the only foreigners many Chinese confronted were mission-
aries, rejection of the West meant rejection of Christian-
ity. In some instances, the struggle of the Chinese to rid 
themselves of the "foreign devils" resulted in violence. 
As the American Protestant campaign escalated during the 
nineteenth century, the prevalence of anti-Christianity 
also increased. The fanatical Boxer Movement of 1900 was 
the zenith of violent attacks against the missionaries and 
their followers. 
The establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 
produced a constitution that included religious freedom. 
Missionaries were optimistic about working under new 
conditions they considered to be progressive and favorable 
for their cause. Chinese warlordism and the global 
28 
conflict of World War I, however, quickly ended this 
peaceful period/ 
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Building on the intellectual currents of the May 
Fourth Movement, anti-foreignism and anti-Christianity in-
creased after 1919 in conjunction with Chinese nationalism. 
Between the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925 and the March 
Twenty-Fourth Incident in 1927, the anti-Christian movement 
became a manifestation of the Nationalist revolution and 
Chinese patriotism. The political and religious implica-
tions of this development presented American missionaries 
with their greatest challenge in China. In an environment 
of renewed hostility, they confronted issues that ques-
tioned their peculiar historical relationship with the 
Chinese. 1 
Anti-Christianity in the 
Nineteenth Century 
Missionaries encountered instances of hostility and 
resistance from the beginning of the Christian century. At 
Fuzhou during the 1850s, the Chinese officials prevented 
American Board workers from moving inside the city. When 
the missionaries tried to visit various sections of the 
port, angry crowds subjected them to "stoning and vio-
lence.··~ In 1864 there were anti-Christian riots, and 
crowds attacked the Methodist and American Board missions. 
None of the foreign Christian workers suffered injury and 
Chines~ officials made restitution fbr the property 
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damage.~ 
These incidents at Fuzhou were typical of anti-Chris-
tian disturbances during the 1860s and 1870s. The attacks 
were usually isolated and only infrequen~ly extended 
outside a district or county. Most of these involved loss 
or damage to missionary property but rarely resulted in 
loss of iife. Some of the riots occurred when Chinese 
students gathered for th~ government civil service examina-
tions. 4 
Members of the educated elite and officials often 
fomented the anti-Christian movements. These men regarded 
the missionaries as rivals. The education of the mission-
aries, their privileged po~ition under the toleration 
clauses, and their influence over Chinese converts threat-
ened the hegemony of the Chinese gentry. Some missionaries 
increased this contention when they abused their extrater-
ritorial status by interfering in local Chinese affairs.~ 
Chinese officials first learned Christianity was a 
potential threat through reading missionary publications. 
It was clear from what foreign Christians wrote that Chris-
tianity was an accretive and proselytizing religion. In 
books written or translated by the missionaries, the 
Chinese discovered that Christianity accompanied the 
political and economic expansion of Westerners. 6 The 
alienation of educated Chines~ and the correlation of 
Christianity and Western expansion became major obstacles 
for the missionaries. 
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Opposition to Christianity among non-elite Chinese 
developed for several reasons. Many resented the mission-
aries' attack on indigenous Chinese religions and ancestor 
veneration. Foreign Christian workers relegated these to 
the "heathen" practice of idolatry. After anti-Christian 
riots, some missionaries obtained "indemnities for the 
destruction of their property. The taxes to pay these came 
from the already impoverished peasants. Non-Christian 
Chinese resented the enhanced status missionary converts, 
or "rice Christians," enjoyed through the protection of 
their foreign benefactors. 7 Missionaries conspicuously 
failed to adopt any aspects of Chinese culture and remained 
an enclave of the West inside their compounds. 8 Using 
emotional. propaganda, the gentry easily mobilized the tra-
ditional ethnocentrism of the masses against the strange 
foreigners in their midst.• 
During the 1890s, anti-Christian riots became more 
widespread, especially in the Chang Jiang valley. Zhou 
Han, a Chinese official, began a systematic campaign 
against the missionaries in 1890-91. Zhou and his follow-
ers instigated riots among the commoners by spreading 
particulary lurid propaganda about the practices of 
Christians. From Changsha, Hunan, the movement escalated 
to include several provinces. Anti-Christian Chinese 
destroyed a large amount of mission property and killed one 
foreign Christian worker. Foreign gun boats intervened to 
rescue endangered missionaries. Western nations pressured 
32 
the Qing government to order the provincial authorities to 
suppress the riots. Similar disturbances continued 
throughout the 1890s and resulted in five missionary 
deaths. 10 
Protestants suffered the worst persecutions of the 
Christian century during the Boxer Movement in 1900. With 
the support of the Empress Dowager Cixi and reactionary 
officials of the Court, the Boxers blindly attacked all 
foreigners. In the general disturbances that affected 
three northern provinces, 188 foreign Protestants, includ-
ing 53 children, lost their lives. The Boxers were 
responsible for the injury or death of a substantially 
greater number of Chinese Christians. 11 
Missionaries generally supported the suppression of 
the Boxers by foreign troops. 1 • Two Americans, Reverend 
W.S. Ament and Reverend E.G. Tewksbury, actually led 
cavalry into the countryside looking for Boxers. When the 
soldiers looted and burned several villages, the incident 
became a major scandal publicized by newspapers in the 
United States. 1 ~ 
/ 
The military power that Western nations so easily 
exerted against the Boxers created a lasting impression 
upon the Chinese. The suppression of the Boxer Movement 
ended the blind anti-foreignism that characterized the 
nineteenth century. Many intellectuals, even within the 
imperial bureaucracy, realized China must change or 
disintegrate. In the interest of self-preservation, the 
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Chinese turned to the West to find those things it needed 
to enter the modern world. 14 
American Protestants believed the Boxer Movement was 
ultimately beneficial in their campaign to save China. The 
episode focused world attention on China and motivated more 
support for the Christians' efforts. They thought the 
repercussions made the Chinese see "that incantations and 
blind fury .cannot solve the problems facing China.":ti:3 One 
missionary, Arthur H. Smith, argued it was in the interest 
of the United States to assist in China's modernization. In 
1906 he suggested that President Roosevelt use the Boxer 
indemnity to establish a scholarship fund for the support 
of Chinese studying in America. 16 
The Republican Revolution 
The Republ.ican revolution that began on 10 October 
1911, further encouraged American missionaries to hope that 
China would soon be a "Christian" democracy. The revolu-
tion was relatively bloodless and only a short period of 
fighting occurred before the last Manchu emperor abdicated 
on 12 February 1912. In the chaos that accompanied the end 
of the Qing dynasty, at least two missionaries and six 
foreign children died. The majority of foreign Christian 
workers left the interior for the safety of the treaty 
ports. Americans chose to emphasize positive aspects of 
the revolution and did not dwell on the casualties. 17 
Some missionaries believed their activity influenced 
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the development of the revolution. The years of missionary 
work "had been spreading ideas which were revolutionary in 
character." 1 "' They maintained that their religion stressed 
democracy and individual freedom, and this caused their 
followers to support the new government. These men looked 
to Sun Vat-sen, the first provisional president of the 
Republic, as an example of Christian influence in the new 
China. 1 "" 
American missionaries perceived the period between the 
establishment bf the Republic and World War I as one of 
unprecedented opportunities in China. The Chinese National 
Assembly included "liberty of religion" in the Provisional 
Constitution proclaimed on 10 March 1912.~° Chinese 
officials "often sougt"!__t the advice of missionaries and 
Chinese pastors about methods of government."EH When 
Sherwood Eddy, an evangelist for the YMCA, toured the 
country in 1914, the Salt Commissioner of Fujian and the 
Foreign Affairs Commissioner of Zhejiang were among his 
converts. The Cabinet asked Christians to set aside 27 
April 1913 as a day of prayer for the new government. 
Large numbers of Chinese attended evangelistic services and 
church membership increased rapidly. 22 
This period with relatively little anti-Christianity 
in China did not last long. Internal and external politi-
cal developments prevented the reforms necessary for 
effective modernization. Warlordism and civil wars 
followed the Republican revolution and institutionalized 
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political chaos far fifteen years. Japanese economic and 
political aggression further aggravated China's weakened 
condition. Many Chinese became disillusioned with some 
aspects of the West fallowing World War I and the Paris 
Peace Conference. From these conditions, renewed hostility 
towards the missionaries and their religion emerged in the 
1920s. 
The May Fourth Movement 
The May Fourth Movement was a phenomenon that greatly 
influenced many of the young Chinese who engaged in the 
anti-Christian campaigns after 1919. The term "May Fourth" 
refers ta a series of student demonstrations that began on 
4 May 1919 in Beijing. The May Fourth Movement, however, 
was much more than this one event. From 1917 to 1921, 
several complicated developments combined to produce a new 
generation of Chinese' intellectuals.~~ 
Chow Tse-tsung, an authority on May Fourth, believes 
it encompassed "the. 'new thought ti de, ' the 1 i ter ary 
revolution, the student movement, the merchants' and 
workers strikes, and the boycott against Japan." The 
movement was not un.iform and included many divergent ideas. 
But "patriotic sentiments, the spirit of Western learning 
and the desire to reevaluate tradition in the light of 
science and democracy in order to build a new China" 
inspired all the participants.~4 
The May Fourth intellectuals advocated abandoning 
China's traditional philosophy, ethics, natural science, 
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social theories, and institutions in favor of Western 
models. They adopted an anti-Confucian concept of man and 
society that emphasized the individual and hi.s happiness. 
"Hard scientism" became the criterion of the iconoclasm of 
the new intelligentsia.~5 Many young Chinese became highly 
critical both of Chinese religions and of Christianity. At 
the invitation of the Young China Association, a Chinese 
student organization, Western philosophers including John 
Dewey and Bertrand Russell visited China. The lectures of 
these men further strengthened the skepticism and material-
ism of the students.~• 
The desire to ~nable China to resist the manipulations 
of stronger, more modern nations motivated many of the 
leaders of the May Fourth Movement. The Twenty-One Demands 
of the Japanese in 1915 and the failure of Chinese dele-
gates to achieve their goals at the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919 added to China's "national humiliation." These 
events intensified the feelings of patriotism and national-
ism that were developing in the new intellectuals during 
this period. Ashamed and insulted by China's inability to 
exert its sovereignty against more powerful aggressors, the 
May Fourth generation passionately pursued their mission to 
create a new China. 
The Twenty-One Demands were an attempt by Japan to 
gain inordinate economic and political privileges in China. 
The demands, delivered in the form of a diplomatic note on 
9 May 1915, called fo~ special recognition of Japan's 
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interests in Shandong, Nei Monggol <Inner Mongolia), and 
Dongbei <Manchuria). Japan was to engage in joint opera-
tion of China's iron and ~teel industries. Also, China was 
to employ Japanese advisors in its political, financial, 
military, and police administrations.~7 Under pressure of 
a Japanese ultimatum, President Yuan Shih-kai accepted most 
of the demands in a treaty on 25 May 1915. There was an 
immediate hostile reaction among Chinese students studying 
in Japan. Many returned to China to protest "Yuan's 
betrayal 11 and organized a boycott of Japanese goods .r..!~.,, 
China's participation in the Paris Peace Conference 
following World War I increased the expectations of many 
Chinese that their nation would regain full sovereignty.~9 
They believed much of the Wilsonian rhetoric about world 
democracy and hoped the conference would serve as a panacea 
for China's domestic and international problems.~0 The 
news on 3 May 1919 that the conference had reject~d the 
proposals of China's delegation shocked the Chinese 
public. 31 
The failure at the Paris Peace Conference was the 
immediate cause of the student demonstrations on 4 May 
1919. It also had the effect of uniting and intensifying 
many of the disparate themes of the broader May Fourth 
Movement. The new intellectuals, particularly students, 
became more organized in their efforts to change China. 
Using mass meetings, demonstrations, and the press, they 
attempted to influence public opinion. The·student 
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movement gained wider support by establishing closer 
contacts with merchants, industrialists, and urban workers. 
Anti-Christianity in the 1920s 
The anti-Christian campaigns of the 1920s were an 
extension of the May Fourth Movement. Many of the leaders 
of the May Fourth Movement also. became leaders of the 
movement against Christianity. They based their rejection 
of Christianity on premises that originated in the intel-
lectual perturbation of May Fourth. The anti-Christians 
used organizations and publicity methods developed during 
the May Fourth Movement. During the 1920s, violent 
confrontations with foreigners galvanized their animosity 
against the West and intensified their campaigns against 
Christianity. 
The first controversy concerning religion that was 
influenced by the May Fourth Movement occurred in September 
1920. The Young China Association passed a resolution 
eMcluding anyone who had any religious beliefs. Some of 
the members maintained modern science relegated all 
religion to the realm of superstition.. Although not 
directed specifically against Christianity, this decision 
led to a debate among the young intellectuals in the 
association which affected their views towards Christians. 
Tian Han, a member of the association studying in 
Japan, believed study of the teachings of Jesus did not 
conflict with other intellectual pursuits. He also called 
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attention to the fact that freedom of religion was in the 
Chinese constitution. Others in the association asserted 
that a. dichotomy existed between religion and science and 
religion served to emancipate man emotionally and subject-
ively. The Young China Association rescinded the resolu-
tion against religious beliefs in 1921. This debate 
emphasized the conflict between science and religion that 
was an integral part of the May Fourth Movement. 3 • 
The first anti-Christian campaign of the 1920s began 
in 1922 in opposition to the Beijing meeting of the World 
Student Christian Federation <WSCF>. This international 
organization, established in 1895, attempted to unite 
Protestant college students throughout the world. John 
Mott of the YMCA was chairman of the WSCF and presided at 
the China conference. Delegates from twenty countries on 
five continents attended. Five hundred Chinese from 
eighteen provinces were also at the meeting held at Qinghua 
University on 4 April 1922.~~ 
In March before the WSCF meeting, Chinese students in 
Shanghai founded the Anti-Christian Federation. A few days 
later, a similar organization, the Anti-Religion Federa-
tion, began in Beijing. 34 These organizations adopted a 
policy opposing all religions, but Christianity was their 
main target. The members of the federati.ons asserted that 
Christianity prevented progress afforded by science because 
it was conservative and fatalistic. Their propaganda 
included the statement: "Christian religion impedes our 
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progress, stupifies [sic] our intelligence, fetters our 
nature, disgraces our personality, pollutes our brains, and 
suppresses our conscience.":::il'.5 On 9 April the Beijing 
federation sponsored a.mass meeting at the National 
University to denounce the WSCF. The demonstration 
attracted over a thousand young Chinese.~• 
The Anti-Religion and Anti-Christian Federations did 
not succeed in disrupting the WSCF conference in Beijing. 
They did, however, quickly form branch organizations in 
other major cities. When WSCF delegates visited these 
centers, they decided not to hold public meetings because 
they feared the anti-Christians would disrupt the assem-
blies.:37 
The 1922 anti-Christian movement subsided with the 
departure of the WSCF delegates. Although there was 
relative calm until 1924-1925, the 1922. incidents facili-
tated later disturbances. The 1922 movement developed 
leaders who were familiar with the techniques of propagan-
da, demonstrations, and mass meetings. These students and 
other young intellectuals had formed an organizational 
structure that benefitted later anti-Christian campaigns.~s 
American diplomats and missionaries viewed the 1922 
anti-Christian movement as a manifestation of "Bolshe-
vis.tic" influence on young Chinese. The attack on Chris-
tianity was also an attack on capitalism and all for~igners 
in China.~• It revealed that some educated Chinese now 
linked capitalism with Christianity and opposed both. Yet 
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the missionaries remained undaunted, believing the campaign 
proved the Chinese were no longer indifferent to Christian-
ity. This increase i~ ~esistance marked a new beginning 
because "it helps frighten away the benefit seekers and 
clears the way for the truth seekers.""+•::> 
The lull in the anti-Christian movement came to an end 
in 1924. In August the Chinese National Student Associa-
tion held its sixth national congress. At this meeting, 
the delegates declared their organization should lead a 
campaign against imperialism by advocating restoration of 
"educational rights." This meant they would oppose Chris-
tian education and attempt t6 disrupt mission schools by 
organizing student strikes. By mid-1925, at least twenty 
incidents occurred in mission schools. 41 
The anti-Christians based their objections to mission 
schools on the belief that Christianity was a form of 
imperialism.""E- Christian schools "de-nationalized" their 
students. The anti-Christians claimed Christian education 
placed too much emphasis on religion by requiring attend-
ance at Bible classes and religious exercises. They also 
objected to the reliance upon English, the lack of Chinese 
language and literature courses, and the low priority of 
science subjects in mission schools. The anti-Christians 
criticized the mission schools' failure to register with 
the national government~~~ 
The Chinese Nationalistic Youth League, which evolved 
from the Young China Society, joined the National Student 
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Association in its attack on missionary education. This 
led to the formation of other organizations in most major 
cities. The Federated Association of Nationalistic Organi-
zations coordinated much of the activity of these new 
societies. This highly-structured form of anti-
Christianity was much different from the spontaneous 
attacks of the nineteenth century. The creation of these 
organizations "was a clear indication of the growing 
intol~rance brought about by a pronounced upsurge of the 
nationalistic sentiment." 44 
The May Thirtieth Incident in 1925 greatly increased 
the success of these organizations in mobilizing popular 
opinion against Christian schools. Labor disputes in 
Japanese-owned cotton mills in Shanghai resulted in this 
violent confrontation between Chinese and foreigners. In 
December 1924~ Chinese workers at the mills went on strike 
to protest low wages. These strikes were violent and in 
one the workers killed a Japanese employer. On 15 May 1925 
there was a riot at one of the mills and Japanese police 
killed a Chinese worker and wounded several others. 
On 30 May a group of college students and workers held 
a memorial service for the dead worker. Afterwards they 
demonstrated against the Japanese and other "imperialists" 
inside the Shanghai International Settlement. This led to 
the arrest of several of the demonstrators. Other students 
followed the British police who had made the arrests back 
to the police station. There a short altercation ensued 
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and the police ejected the students. By this time, a crowd 
had gathered outside the station and the police attempted 
to disperse it. When the crowd recoiled and moved towards 
the jail, the officer in charge shouted a warning in both 
English and Chinese. The crowd continued to advance and 
the officer ordered the policemen to fire, killing twelve 
Chinese and wounding seventeen. 4~ 
Although several commissions investigated the shooting 
during the following months, no real settlement occurred in 
the incident. The Shanghai Municipal Council, which 
governed the International Settlement and was composed of 
foreigners, supported entirely the actions of the police. 
An International Commission of Judges with a British, an 
American, and a Japanese member, generally supported the 
findings of the Municipal Council. 4 • 
There was foreign criticism of the incident. The 
report of E. Finley Johnson, the American judge on the 
International Commission, criticized the actions of both 
the Municipal Council and the British police. 47 The 
foreign diplomats in Beijing appointed their own investi-
gating committee and its report was highly critical of the 
foreigners involved in the incident. 4 e 
Eventually, the British polite commissioner of the 
International Settlement and the officer who ordered the 
shooting resigned. The Shanghai Municipal Council offered a 
seventy-five thousand dollar indemnity for the fatalities 
but the Chinese rejected this. These efforts at concili-
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ation by the foreigners, however, came six months after the 
incident. Frank Rawlinson, editor of the Chinese Recorder, 
called attention to another problem with the attempts to 
settle the matter. He wrote: "For a judicial commission to 
be composed only of foreigners--virtually the defendants in 
the case--is almost a fiasco. " 4 """ 
The May Thirtieth Incident electrified and consoli-
dated Chinese popular opinion. The Chinese believed the 
incident was the fault of the British and was only one 
event in a history of imperialistic aggression.~0 They did 
not hesitate to generalize this hostility to all foreigners 
in China. The fact that Stirling Fessenden, an American, 
was chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council was enough 
to implicate the United States.~ 1 Yip Ka-che, in his study 
of anti-Christianity, maintains: "Never before in Chinese 
history had the Chinese people been so united in their 
drive against foreign encroachment. 11 ~:; 2 
Demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and violence in 
other cities immediately followed the Shanghai shootings. 
In June, disturbances occurred in Beijing, Jingjiang, 
Chongqing, Nanjing, Jiujiang, Hankou, and Guangzhou. The 
most violent of these accompanied a boycott of British 
goods and factories in Hongkong and Guangzhou. There, on 
23 June, one Frenchman and fifty Chinese died in an 
exchange of gunfire between foreign troops and demonstra-
tors. Four British soldiers were also wounded. The 
boycott continued into 1926 and was relatively effective 
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due to the support of the KMT.w~ 
The increase in confrontations between Chinese and 
foreigners in 1925 revitalized anti-Christianity in China. 
The .seventh congress of the National Student Association 
met in Shanghai on 7 July 1925. The delegates adopted a 
comprehensive resolution against Christianity. This "was 
one of the most significant documents of the anti-Christian 
movement."'54 The resolution asserted that Christianity was 
an instrument of imperialism. The congress instructed 
students to mobiliie the rural masses during winter and 
summer vacations. It also scheduled an "anti-Christian 
week," 22-28 December, in which to hold demonstrations.~-5!.5 
AMti-Christianity in China became stronger during 
1926-1927 in conjunction with the Northern Expedition of 
the Guangzhou-based Nationalist government. This civil war 
between rival northern arid southern fa~tions was one of 
many that occurred during this period. The Northern 
Expedition, however, succeeded in uniting China under one 
government for the first time in over a decade. Attacks on 
missionaries and missionary property were part of the 
general disturbances and anti-foreignism that accompanied 
this war. 
After the May Thirtieth Incident, Chinese military and 
civil authorities began to ignore attacks on both foreign 
and Chinese Christians. This was a problem "particularly 
in areas contra 11 ed by the Kuomintang [ KMT J. "~~;e:. Clemens 
Granskou, a missionary for the Norwegian Lutheran Church of 
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America, witnessed a KMT soldier harass a fellow missionary 
on a train to Hankou in 1925. The soldier stuck a revolver 
in the missionary's back and said, "How do you like this, 
you foreign devil?" The missionary escaped injury by 
mainta.ining his composure and asking stupid questions.~7 
Incidents like this became more common and more 
violent after the Northern Expedition began on 9 July 
1926.~8 Both soldiers and party workers distributed anti-
Christian propaganda in the areas that came under KMT 
contra 1. Looting of foreign residences was common and 
"soldiers,. workers, and peasants were in fact responsible 
for widespread commandeering and occupation of mission 
properties. "5""" In some instances KMT troops occupied 
mission property and used it for their.barracks.• 0 These 
disturbances included student strikes against mission 
schools and persecution of Chinese Christians. 
When KMT troops arrived at the school for American 
missionaty children at Pingdingshan, Henan, Clemens 
Granskou believed they were well-disciplined. But as more 
troops came, their anti-fore~gnism increased and they began 
taking food from the missionaries. Soon after this the 
missionaries left for the safety of the treaty ports.• 1 
Walter Judd, a medical missionary for the American 
Board, worked at Shaowu, Fujian, during the Northern 
Expedition. Soldiers first occupied this city in December 
1926. They took over the American Board hospital and asked 
Judd to treat their wounded. Judd volunteered his services 
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and there was little trouble. These troops soon left and 
another contingent arrived in January 1927. These soldiers 
accused Judd of being British and started to execute him. 
When the local magistra.te arrived and assured the soldiers 
Judd was an American, they released him. He remained at 
Shaowu and treated KMT troops until 1930.•~ 
In January 1927 an anti-Christian riot at Fuzhou 
resulted in the evacuation of the American missionaries 
working there. The Nationalists had controlled the city 
for several weeks without any incidents. During a period 
of fighting between the soldiers themselves, an anti-
foreign riot began that lasted three days. A crowd 
composed of soldiers and civilians looted the residences of 
the American Board missionaries, the YMCA, the Methodist 
Church and hospital, and the Anglican hospital. On 19 
January the American missionaries went to the Philippines 
aboard the U.S. destroyer, Pillsbury.63 
The sporadic departure of missionaries from areas 
controlled by the Nationalists became a general evacuation 
after the March Twenty-Fourth Incident at Nanjing in 1927. 
This was "the most spectacular of the attacks on the 
missionaries" and resulted in the highest number of deaths 
of foreigners during the Northern Expedition.•4 This 
incident and the subsequent withdrawal. of the missionaries 
had fateful consequences for Christianity in China. 
On 23 March 1927 northern troops withdrew from Nanjing 
and during the night a Nationalist army entered the city. 
In the morning of the twenty-fourth, groups of soldiers 
systematically looted the American, British, and Japanese 
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consulates. The troops also attacked mission property and 
rioted at Nanjing University, a mission school. There, a 
KMT soldier shot and killed Dr. J.E. Williams, Vice-
President of the university. A total of six foreigners 
died in the attacks and six were wounded, including the 
British consul. 
A group of Americans and British fled the consulates 
and sought refuge at the compound of Standard Oil Company. 
When this came under attack in the afternoon, two American 
destroyers and a British cruiser on the Chang Jiang nearby 
bombarded the area around the compound. This action ended 
the attacks on foreigners and those at the Standard Oil 
property escaped to the river. 
The next day other contingents of the Nationalist army 
entered the city and restored order. They released all 
foreigners, including a group held at Nanjing University. 
By the twenty-sixth virtually all foreigners had left 
Nanjing for Shanghai. The rioters had sacked all mission-
ary residences and burned nine mission buildings. The 
reports of the number of Chinese killed in the barrage on 
the twenty-fourth varied from four to thousands. 6~ 
In the international controversy that followed the 
Nanjing Incident, the persons re~ponsible for the killings 
other than Nationalist troops "seem not to have been 
judically [sic] established."°''..:.. Some of the KMT command-
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ers claimed outlaws and "ruffians" in Nationalist uniforms 
were responsible. Another commander, Yang Chieh, told the 
Japanese consul that Communists in Nanjing instigated the 
soldiers. This version, adamantly supported by the 
Japanese government, soon became the one most foreigners 
accepted. It is also the explanation later adopted by 
Chiang Kai-shek and the Right wing of the KMT. 67 
Seventeen American missionaries who were at Nanjing 
issued a written statement from Sh~nghai giving their 
version of the incident. They believed "those outrages 
were committed by armed Nationalist soldiers in uniform, 
who acted with the knowledge and approval of their superior 
officers." They also accepted. the explanation that Com-
munists in the Nationalist party were ultimately responsi-
ble. The missionaries maintained they would have all died 
if not for the action of the military vessels. 68 
The immediate effect of the March Twenty-Fourth 
Incident on American missions was the evacuation of the 
missionaries. Before the incident, American consular 
authorities made "secret suggestions" to some of the 
missionaries regarding their presence in combat zones. 
Following the violence at Nanjing, the diplomats strongly 
urged all missionaries to seek refuge in the major treaty 
ports. The American government also pressured the home 
mission boards to evacuate their workers to the treaty 
ports or to the Philippines and Japan.•• 
In the middle of 1927 missionary work in China came to 
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a halt. By April over 1,500 missionaries had left the in-
terior for Shanghai and other protected ports. Less than 
500 out of a total 6,600 missionaries remained outside the 
treaty ports in May. During this period, 3,000 missionar-
ies left China; many did not return. 7 ° Frank Rawlinson 
tried to remain optimistic, but he "recognized that one era 
of Chris-tian effort in China is closed with somewhat of a 
shock." 7 :1. Although new foreign Christian workers replaced 
many of the missionaries who did not return to China, the 
conditions they confronted were more formidable after 1927. 
Nationalists, Communists, and 
Anti-Christianity 
The relationship between the KMT, the Chinese Commu-
nist Party <CCP), and the anti-Christian movement began in 
January 1924. The First National Congress of the KMT 
adopted a "Manifesto" that had "an intensely anti-
imperial ist character." 712 This document was the product of 
cooperation between Sun Yat-sen and a Russian advisor, 
Michael Borodin. Under the influence of Borodin, Sun had 
already agreed to allow Chinese Communist Party members to 
join the KMT and twenty delegates at the congress were 
Communists. After this the Nationalist movement became 
synonymous with "opposition to the political and economic 
privileges of foreigners in China." 7 ;3 
Between the First National Congress and the Second in 
January 1926, the KMT became more closely associated with · 
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anti-Christianity. During 1925 both the KMT and the CCP 
supported anti-Christian parades and street lectures in 
Guangdong province. Nationalist troops occupied and 
destroyed missionary property on two occasions. 74 Douglas 
Jenkins, U.S. Consul-General at Guangzhou, reported he 
believed the KMT attempted to gain the support of students 
by mobilizing them against the mission schools. 7~ 
The Second National Congress officially endorsed the 
anti-Christian movement by adopting "a strong resolution 
charging schools, journals and churches run by missionaries 
as being 'the tongues and claws of imperialism."' This 
policy became effective almost immediately when KMT fo~c~B 
gained control of Guangxi province in early 1926. Several 
anti-Christian riots and looting of missionary property 
occurred with the advance of the Nationalist troops. 76 
Many Nationalist leaders had ambivalent attitudes 
towards Christianity. Some were Christians and many were 
graduates of Christian schools. Although they recognized 
the political expediency of supporting anti-Christianity, 
they believed attacks on mission institutions damaged the 
reputation of the KMT abroad and with Chinese Christians. 77 
The actions of Chiang Kai-shek reflected this ambiva-
lence. In January 1926, Chiang criticized American policy 
in China and denounced Christianity as being hypocriti-
cal. 79 As the Northern Expedition advanced and his troops 
attacked mission property and missionaries, Chiang became 
more conciliatory. As early as 20 July he issued a procla-
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mation promising protection of all foreigners and their 
property. 7~ On 19 November, Chiang stated he had no 
quarrel with Christianity and ''the elimination of missi~ns 
from China is not part of our program~ueio 
After the March Twenty-Fourth Incident, Chiang and the 
Nationalists worked to establish a rapprochement with 
missionaries and Chinese Christians. This was actually an 
attempt to calm the hostility of foreign governments 
following the Northern Expedition. After Chiang's purge of 
the Communists from the ranks of the KMT in 1927, he 
claimed all anti-Christian activity had been Communist 
inspired. Chiang completed his reconciliation with 
Christianity with his baptism on 23 October 1930. 81 
The literature of American missionaries is filled with 
numerous accounts of violent incidents involving foreign 
Christians and Chinese during the period 1919-1928. 82 
Remarkably, only twelve missionaries died because of 
violent acts, including six Americans. In the five years 
following 1929, fifteen more perished, a relative low 
number of fatalities considering the dangerous circum-
stances.a~ It was the particular nature of the hostility 
directed against the missionaries that distinguished this 
period. 
The anti-Christian campaigns of the 1920s were dif-
ferent from the opposition the missionaries experienced 
earlier in the Christian century. The anti-Christians of 
this period were products of the May Fourth Movement. A 
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passionate belief in science and democracy motivated their 
rej~ction of all religions, including Christianity. 
Intense feelings of nationalism and patriotism dictated 
their goals of ridding China of warlords and foreign 
aggression. The leaders of this movement mobilized a much 
larger f6llowing than preceding anti-Christians. When 
anti-Christianity became a part of the KMT and CCP politi-
cal program against imperialism and capitalism, the 
possibility for missionary success in China diminished 
greatly. 
Hist6rians have explained anti-Christianity in China 
during this period in different ways. Kenneth Latourette, 
a China missionary turned historians believes a combination 
of factors was r~sponsible. Among those he lis~s are 
nationalism, destructive criticism from the May Fourth 
Movement, Western agnosticism imported by returned stu-
dents, and traditional Chinese rejection of theology, gods, 
spirits, and immortality.e-
Chow Tse-tsung relegates th~ anti-Christian movement 
to the status of "later controversies" evolving from the 
May Fourth Movement.a~ Yamamoto Tatsuro and Yamamoto 
Sumiko maintain that ideas of nationalism, anti-imperial-
ism, and anti-capitalism dominated the movement. They 
attribute the origin of the movement to the influence of 
Communism. After 1925, nationalism that was basically 
anti-foreign supported and developed the anti-Christian 
campaigns.s• 
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Yip Ka-che and Jessie Gregory Lutz emphasize the role 
of both political parties in the spread of the movement. 
Lutz believes anti-Christianity lacked effective goals and 
political allies in the early 1920s. After 1924 the anti-
Christians joined the wider campaign against imperialism by 
allying with the KMT and CCP. This "politicized" the anti-
Christian tradition. The movement's leaders began to 
demand that mission schools "serve the orthodoxy of the new 
China and become the ideological bastions of Chinese 
sovereignty." 197 
Yip credits the Chinese Communist Party for first 
using the slogans of anti-imperialism and anti-militarism. 
After the allianc~ of the Communists and the Nationalists, 
"their joint efforts succeeded in hastening, -~he process by 
which Chinese nationalism became identified with anti-
imperialism." The propaganda of the KMT and CCP described 
Christianity as "cultural imperialism." Party workers 
accused mission schools of producing "unpatriotic" Chinese. 
The May Thirtieth Incident acted as a catalyst in intensi-
fying the nationalism of the Chinese and the anti-Christian 
movement became part of the anti-imperialist struggle. 
"Many Chinese intellectuals now believed that Christian 
missionaries were agents of imperialist exploitation in 
China. "se:-J 
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CHAPTER III 
MISSIONARIES AND CHINESE NATIONALISM: 
THE ISSUES 
The evacuati.on of the missionaries after the March 
Twenty-Fourth Incident in 1927 was not of long duration. 
Many began to return to their stations in the summer and 
fall. of that year. Anti-Christian attacks diminished after 
Chiang Kai-shek consolidated his control over the KMT and 
established the Nationalist regime at Nanjing in 1928. 
Occasional demonstrations, school strikes, and violence 
continued to plague the missionaries' efforts. Yet the 
level of organization and intensity of anti-Christianity in 
China subsided until after World War II. 
When American missionaries returned to their mission 
stations in 1927 and 1928, they confronted new conditions 
and old issues. In their absence, many of their converts 
I 
lefi the churches; some joined the ranks of the anti-
Christians. Chinese filled faculty vacancies at mission 
schools and church administrative positions. Chinese 
Christians no longer accepted missionary leadership as 
easily as in the past. Some missionaries doubted the 
Chinese still wanted or needed their ministry. 
The critical decade of China missions was 1919 to 
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1928. Nationalism renewed and intensified Chinese objec-
tions to the continuance of the "unequal" treaties. The 
United States and other Western nations refused to relin-
quish the advantages these treaties afforded their citi-
zens. Anti-Christians based many of their accusations 
against Christianity on its connection with the treaties. 
Chinese Christians and many missionaries joined the anti-
Christians in questioning the maintenance of extraterritor-
iality under the treaties. Treaty revision was a difficult 
problem with no easy solutions. 
Anti-Christians attacked mission educational insti-
tutions because they produced "denationalized" and "unpa-
triotic" students. They also criticized the failure of 
Christian schools to reg!st~r with the Chinese government 
and become part of the educational system of China. The 
importance of this issue increased as both the northern 
warlord government at Beijing and the KMT began campaigns 
to "nationalize" missionary education. 
Traditionally, the professed goal of the missionaries 
was the creation of Chinese churches that were self-
/ 
governing, self-propagating, and self-supporting. During 
this decade, Chinese Christians and many missionaries 
questioned the progress made in producing an "indigenous" 
Christianity in China. A decisive problem for the mission-
aries was the lack of Chinese leaders, Chinese financial 
support, and Chinese forms of worship in the churches. 
Many of these issues were not new. Foreign Christians 
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addressed them at various times during the Christian 
century. It was the intensity and divisiveness of the 
attacks that was now unique. During the 1920s, Chinese 
nationalism magnified the importance of these problems and 
demanded their solution. Because many of the missionaries' 
followers joined the opposition, it was impossible for 
foreign Christian workers to ignore the issues and continue 
the status quo. The missionaries' perceptions and re-
sponses to the issues reveal their relationship to Chinese 
nationalism. That relationship determined their ability to 
continue their campaign to save China and convert it to a 
"Christian" democracy. 
Missionaries, Converts, and Treaties 
International treaties between China and the United 
States were responsible for the peculiar status of American 
missionaries and their converts during the Christian 
century. The charge that missionaries were the "running 
dogs of imperialism" referred to their relationship with 
these treaties and the military power that enforced them. 1 
Because the treaties protected Chinese Christians, they 
confronted the charge they were "unpatriotic" when they 
adopted the foreign religion.~ 
Many missionaries admitted that Christianity inherited 
a negative legacy because of its inclusion in the treaties. 
They realized their efforts were part of the total impac~ 
of the West upon China. Missionaries, like other Western-
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ers, had displayed attitudes "of superiority and domination 
that are peculiarly resented. 11 '.:1 Many Chinese mistakenly 
considered them to be representatives of their home govern-
ments. 4 Foreign Christian workers of the 1920s questioned 
the wisdom of their past involvement in treaty negotiations 
and the subsequent relationship between Christianity and 
Western military power that evolved during the Christian 
century. 
The nineteenth-century treaties between China and the 
United States affected the missionaries in three major 
ways. The treaties allowed them legally to live in China 
and proselytize Chinese. Like all American citizens, the 
agreements granted missionaries the privileges of extrater-
ritoriality. Under the treaties, the Chinese government 
agreed to protect Chinese converts from persecution. 
As described above, missionaries began their campaign 
in China in defiance of Chinese law.~ Before 1844 the 
Chinese government prohibited its subjects from accepting 
Christianity and missionaries from entering the country. 
Like Westerners engaged in the opium trade, missionaries 
/ 
chose to ignore the law. 
The Treaty of Wangxia, the first agreement between the 
United States and China, only addressed the condition of 
missionaries as American citizens. Article XVII stipulated 
United States citizens could engage ''in hiring sites from 
the inhabitants on which to construct houses and places of 
business, and also hospitals, churches and cemeteries." 
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The efforts of Dr. Peter Parker, an American missionary, 
were responsible for the inclusion of this article.• 
In addition to the right to build churches, mission-
aries benefitted from the agreement in the treaty that 
granted extrate~ritoriality to American citizens. 7 This 
condition allowed Americans to reside in China but be 
exempt from Chinese law. They were subject only to United 
States law as enforced by American consuls. Although the 
word "extraterritoriality" did not appear in any treaties 
between the United States and China until 1903, it was 
commonly used to describe t~is condition of consular 
jurisdiction exempt from Chinese law.a 
The right of foreigners to reside in China and ignore 
Chinese law became a point of great contention with the 
Chinese. The justification for this condition was the 
protection of American citizens from the "imposition of the 
severe and barbarous penalties" of an inadequate Chinese 
law system. 9 Over time, abuses developed in the. adminis-
tration of extraterritorial privileges. Foreigners, 
including Americans, used extraterritoriality to support 
/ 
''leased areas, concessions, settlements, navigation rights, 
their own military and naval protection, certain customs 
privileges, and other immunities. 11 1° 
Among the abuses of extraterritoriality was the travel 
of American missionaries into the interior of China. An 
imperial edict of 1845 lifted the prohibition against 
Chinese accepting Protestantism. It also "definitely 
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prohibited missionaries from entering the interior of the 
country to propagate religion." 1· 1 Missionaries ignored 
this and left the treaty ports to preach in the interior. 
Because the Treaty of Wangxia afforded the missionaries 
extraterritorial status, Chinese officials could not stop 
this. In a gesture. of compliance, "British authorities 
made some efforts to restrain British a.nd even American 
missionaries, b~t the French and American Governments did 
not." :i.e 
The treaties of 1858, 1880, and 1903 strengthened the 
position of American missionaries in China. The Treaty of 
Tianjin in 1858 was the first American treaty to include 
provisions just for missionaries. It reaffirmed extrater-
ritoriality and provided toleration for missionaries and 
their converts. Yet it did not contain a ·specific: article 
allowing travel into the interior. 1 ~ It was the Chinese 
text of the French Treaty of Tianjin <1860) that first 
granted this right to French missionaries. The Chinese 
text of the French treaty also allowed the purchase of 
property and c:onstruc:tion of houses and c:hufches in the 
interior outside the treaty ports. 14 
American missionaries believed the articles in the 
Chinese text of the F~enc:h treaty applied to them through 
the most-favored-nation clause in the American Treaty of 
Tianjin. United States diplomats were reluctant to agree 
with this and some actually denied that the French treaty 
applied to Americans. Charles Denby, American Minister in 
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Beijing, reported: "Our own missionaries have often cited 
this clause as being some sort of a basis for the right to 
go into the interior." He did not agree with this and 
"assumed, therefore, that the right to settle at will in 
the interior does not exist." Denby admitted, however, 
that the inclusion of extraterritoriality in the American 
treaties "practically" allowed the missionaries to do as 
they pleased in China. 1 ~ 
Frederick Low, who preceded Denby as United States 
Minister, also held that American missionaries had no right 
under the Treaties of Tianjin to go into the interior. In 
1870 Low discovered the discrepancy between the French and 
Chinese texts of the 1860 treaty but decided not to publi-
cize this or notify the Chinese government. 1 • Low later 
wrote Secretary of State Fish that his "opinion is clear 
and decided that missionaries have no right to reside 
permanently away from the open ports." 17 Fish approved of 
Law's position and agreed that "the treaty [of Tianjin] 
does not guarantee to missionaries a right to establish 
themselves in inland places. 11 1r:3 
Yet both L.ow and Fish believed that the long-term 
residence of some missionaries in the interior had estab-
1 ished a precedent the United States should protect. If 
missionaries initially had the tacit approval of local 
Chinese officials for their presence in the community, the 
State Department would uphold their right to stay there. 
Consuls could not, however, insist that Chinese officials 
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accept missionaries in new locations where they were 
opposed. 
The commercial treaty between the United States and 
China in 1880 restated the stipulation on extraterritorial-
ity for American citizens. 1 ~ It did not specifically 
address the missionary question. During this. period, 
American missionaries traveled, bought property, and built 
-churches and houses in the interior. These actions "were 
long a subject of debate and often a cause of friction."<?.<:;. 
The treaty of 1903 legally established the right of 
the American missionaries to leave the treaty ports and 
operate in the interior. Article XIV included much of the 
wording of Article XXIX from the 1858 treaty. It added the 
_f"ight of missionary "societies" to rent and lease in 
perpetuity "buildings or lands in all parts of the Empire 
for missionary purposes." Article XIV prohibited mission-
aries from interfering with Chinese officials' jurisdiction 
over Chinese converts. It also stipulated that "native 
authorities" should not "make any distinction between 
converts a~d non-converts, but shall administer the laws 
I 
without partiality. 11 e1. 
In this treaty, the United States made a token conces-
sion towards Chinese demands to end extraterritoriality. 
Article XIV stated the United States would assist China in 
reforming its judicial system. The United States would 
also "relinquish extra-territorial rights when satisfied 
that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for 
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their administration, and other considerations warrant it 
in so doing. 11 &. 2 During the next three decades, the Chinese 
based their attempts to renegotiate the treaties and 
abolish extraterritorial rights on this clause. 
American missionaries were not passive recipients of 
the benefits of toleration clauses and extraterritoriality 
during the nineteenth century. Through the treaties, a 
relationship developed between American diplomats, American 
military power, and American missionaries. Because the 
Chinese government opposed their work, the ministry of 
foreign Christians depended upon the treaty privileges. 
This relationship was responsible for the Chinese belief 
that Christian missions were an extension of Western 
encroachment on China's sovereignj;_y._ 
Missionaries acted as interpreters and secretaries for 
the diplomats and some ex-missionaries became United States 
officials. Peter Parker was Am~rican Commissioner to China 
from 1855 to 1857. He advocated .the invasion of Taiwan to 
force China to open treaty negotiations with the Western 
nations. The Buchanan administr~tion did not support this 
/ 
and quickly replaced Parker. This overt aggressiveness 
"was at the time far more characteristic of the missionar-
ies than of merchants."e;;s 
Before 1900 the majority of missionaries did not· 
hesitate to exercise their prerogatives under the treaties. 
When Chinese obstructed their activities, missionaries made 
complaints to their consuls and to Chinese officials. Some 
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"were disposed, too, to stretch some of their privileges to 
the limit and to claim the benefit of any doubt.""'-\"'+ 
Nineteenth-century missionaries supported two wars in order 
to obtain their special position in China and were vigilant 
in maintaining their "treaty rights."•:.?.~::; 
Charles Denby, like many American diplomats in China, 
was ambivalent towards the missionaries. He denied some of 
the privileges claimed by the missionaries and believed 
they should receive the same treatment as other United 
States citizens. Yet he praised their work in "civilizing" 
China. Denby further admitted: "The diplomatic agent 
recognizes that the complete civilization of a people means 
the increase of trade and commerce with the rest of the 
world. "2 '"' Regardless of motivation, most American diplo-
mats. upheld the rights of the missionaries under the 
treaties. 
In the 1920s, actions by American officials and 
missionaries reinforced the Chinese belief that there was a 
close connection between the two. President Coolidge, the 
nation's premier diplomat, declared missions were America's 
number one interest in China. 27 American consuls in China 
scrutinized the anti-Christian campaigns and intervened to 
protect the treaty rights of foreign Christians. 28 
The status of Chinese converts further complicated the 
relationship of the missionaries and the treaties. 
Although the treaties only protected Chinese Christians 
from persecution, the desire of the missionaries to help 
their followers. gradually expanded this protection. The 
missionaries approached Chinese magistrates on behalf of 
their converts and generally used their influence to 
benefit Chinese Christians. This was an abuse of the 
missionaries' extraterritorial rights and had negative 
consequenc:es.e9 
Sbme Chinese joined the churches only to obtain the 
protection of the missionaries. By claiming to be Chris-
tians, they were able to influence magistrates and other 
officials.~0 Missionaries in the 1920s were sensitive to 
the criticism that their predec~ssors and some Chinese 
abused the treaties this way. They realized that in 
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practice the treaties separated "the Chinese Christians 
from the mass of the.ir fellow countrymen." Furthermore, 
"the Chinese authorities unwisely but persistently made a 
sharp distinction in the terms used to describe Christians 
and other Chinese subjects.";91 
Another issue that evolved from the treaties and· 
extraterritoriality was the use of the mission compound as 
an asylum. In a study of this phenomenon, Gladys Quale 
found that Chinese perceived mission c6mpounds to be havens 
of safety during violent disturbances. Both Christians and 
non-Christians sought refuge inside the compo~nds during 
fighting between warlords or during bandit attacks. Fear 
of Western military power was the basis of the ability of· 
missionaries to protect Chinese. This relationship streng-
thened the Chinese perception that foreign Christians were 
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part of Western imperialism.~~ 
Anti-Christianity and the actions of the Nationalists 
ended the role of mission compounds as asylums. The 
occupation of mission property by KMT troops "displayed to 
Chinese all over the nation the disappearance in fact of 
the privileges reta.ined in name by foreigners in China." 
After 1924, mission compounds served ~s refuges only in 
areas not controlled by the KMT. Quale believes the 
relationship between Western power and missions was a 
factor in Chinese resentment of foreigners. It also 
motivated their attempts at treaty revision during the 
1920S. S:Et 
John Carter Vincent, a former Americ~n consular 
official, analyzed the effects of changing conditions in 
China on extraterritoriality. He believes the nineteenth-
century system depended upbn ''a qui•scent native society 
indifferent to •isms' of a national or patriotic sort." 
Extraterritoriality worked because the Chinese government 
was too weak to assert popular leadership. It also relied 
upon the ability and willingness of the foreign governments 
/ 
to use force to support their "acquired rights." These 
conditions no longer existed in the 1920s and the diplo-
mats' ability to enforce extraterritorial rights became 
more difficult.:::14 
One of China's attempts to revise its treaties 
occurred at the Washington Conference in 1921-1922. At the 
invitation of President Harding, seven Western nations, 
78 
China, and Japan attended the meeting. The conference 
attempted to solve some of the problems in East Asia not 
resolved at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 
The Nine-Power Treaty of 6 February 1922 incorporated 
some of the agreements worked out in the conference. Elihu 
Root, an American r~presentative, consolidated a. ten-point 
program proposed by the Chinese delegation into four 
general principles in the treaty. In signing the treaty, 
the powers agreed to: respect China's territorial integ-
rity, not seek spheres of influence, respect its neutral-
ity, and honor equal economic opportunity for all.~~ 
These provisions did not address the specific griev-
ances of the Chinese. They proposed that definite dates be 
set for the termination of tariff controls and the aboli-
tion of extraterritoriality. The foreign delegates avoided 
both of these questions by referring them to special 
commissions to be convened at a later date.~6 
Dorothy Borg, in her study of American policy during 
this period, believes the foreign governments did not want 
to modify their positions in China. They "were determined 
/ 
not to ruffle the status quo to an extent that would 
seriously disturb their own interests." The work of the 
American delegation to the conference produced the "Wash-
ington Formula." This policy continued the traditional 
position of the foreign nations. The treaty powers "would 
not relinquish their treaty rights until China had devel-
oped the capacity to govern herself according to Western 
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standards of efficiency.";;37 
The controversy over tariff autonomy and extraterri-
toriality continued throughout the 1920s. As part of the 
"national humiliation," these issues were the focus of the 
anti-foreign and anti-Christian movement after 1925. The 
KMT effectively used these injustices to generate popular 
support for the party. When the Northern Expedition 
consolidated their control over China, the Nationalists 
claimed to be the legitimate central government. They 
renewed the efforts of China to reg~in its sovereignty 
through treaty revision. 
Between 25 July and 27 December 1928, the Nationalist 
government negotiated eleven new treaties. All of these, 
including the Sino-American treaty of 25 July, recognized 
China's right to set its own tariffs. Belgium, Denmark, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain further agreed to relinquish 
extraterritoriality by 1 January 1930.~e Negotiations with 
the other nations on this question continued into 1929 
without progress. On 6 July 1929, China unilaterally 
proclaimed "that as of December 31, 1929 all foreign 
jurisdictional rights in China would be terminated.";:.!"'' 
This proclamation had no effect on the extraterri-
torial status of Americans or any other foreigners in 
China. 40 These nations ignored the demands of the Nation-
alists and the Chinese did not have the military capability 
to alter the situation. The United States did not surren-
der extraterritoriality until 1943 when China was an ally 
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in World War II. At that time, it was a concession with 
"little more than psychological value." In his monograph 
on the issue, Wesley Fishel concludes "the compelling 
consideration throughout the period of the decline of 
extraterritoriality was not international idealism, but 
national self-interest. 11 '·• 1· 
In the 1920s American missionaries began to support 
the efforts of China to renegotiate its treaties with the 
United States. They particul~rly favored the abolition of 
extraterritoriality. They realized the actions of earlier 
missionaries in obtaining and developing the special 
position of Christianity in China created a negative legacy 
vulnerable to attack. A small minority of missionaries 
understood and sympathized with Chinese nationalism. This 
divided the missionary community as did many of the other 
issues of this fateful decade. 4 e 
"Recovery of Educational Rights" 
The institution of Christian education was another 
target of Chinese nationalism. Anti-foreignism inspired 
attacks on mission schools because of their ownership. 
Anti-Christianity motivated opposition because of the 
religious content of the education. Both the northern 
warlord government in Beijing and the KMT attempted to gain 
control of Christian education in the 1920s. The issues 
involved in the "recovery of educational rights" produced a 
quandary for the missionaries in China. 
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Christian education was a conspicuous aspect of the 
missionaries' presence. In 1920, mission schools employed 
10,000 Chinese, 50 percent of all those working for the 
missionaries. There were 200,000 Chinese children enrolled 
in 6,890 Christian schools at the middle school level and 
below. The missionaries also conducted 106 nursing schools 
with 1,380 students. Christian education was especially 
beneficial to women as 31 percent of the primary school 
students were girls. 43 
American missionaries made Christian education one of 
their major undertakings. American facilities had 50 
percent of the lower primary students and 66 percent of the 
higher primary and middle school students who attended 
Christian schools. Americans were dedicated to higher 
education in China and supported it financially and by 
supplying teachers and administrators. In 1920 there were 
14 Christian colleges with plants valued at $6 million 
<Mex.) and total annual expenditures of $1.2 million. 44 
These numbers increased subst•ntially during the next 
ten years. In 1923 the annual expenditures of the mission 
co 11 eges reached $4. 5 mi'l lion <Mex.> and the number of 
students increased to 4,700 in 1930. 4~ Christian colleges 
had the capability to produce outstanding graduates who 
achieved recognition. In 1925, 12 percent of Chinese 
included in Who's Who in China attended mission schools. 
In 1931, 16 percent had a Christian education. 46 
The missionaries did not develop a nati~nal system of 
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education i.n China .. The institutions and educators of the 
various Protestant denominations, however, cooperated on 
many issues and shared similar goals and beliefs. One 
av~nue of cooperation was through the China Christian 
Educational Association <CCEA>. 
The CCEA originated at ~ national conference for 
Pr~testant missionaries at Shanghai in 1890. 47 First known 
as the Educational Association of China, its name changed 
to China Christian Educational Association in 1915. The 
CCEA held triennial conferences and published a quarterly 
journal, The Educational Review, to promote Christian 
education in China. It also produced textbooks for the 
mission schools and acted as a lobbying agency with the 
Chinese government.4e 
The China Educational Cbmmission is an example of how 
missionaries cooperated through the CCEA. In 1915 the 
Advisory Council of the CCEA proposed that a commission of 
recognized professional educ~tors evaluate Christian 
education in China. Because of World War I, the commission 
did not meet in China until September 1921. Sixteen 
missionary societies sponsored the group of seventeen 
American educators. Dr. E.D. Burton, President of Chicago 
University, was Chairman of the Commission.""•"" 
The commission published its findings in Christian 
Education in China in 1922. This report called for an 
expansion of missionary education in China. It defined the 
role of education in the total missionary effort as 
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bringing ''individuals into personal relations with Jesus 
Christ, and the creation of a Christian social order .... The 
commission stated that Christians must control mission 
education. l'!'.i<:) 
The reaffirmation of Christian education in China by 
the Burton commission was a response to increasing Chinese 
criticisms. After 1922 the "recovery of educational 
rights" movement became an integral part of the anti-
Christian and anti-foreign campaigns. The opponents of 
mission schobls accused them of usurping the right of the 
Chinese government to control education in China. They 
also emphasized the foreign and religious content of the 
curriculum of Christian schools.1'5 1 
Some Chinese claimed that graduates of Christian 
schools were "only suitable as recruits [converts], as 
compradors of the foreign trading houses, or, at most, as 
would-be drawing-room diplomatists." The graduates of the 
schools were uninterested in problems of China and sought 
personal success only. 5 a Others pointed out that mission 
~chools denationalized Chinese by promoting Western 
subjects over Chinese subjects. This charge accentuated 
the reliance of Christian educators on English and the 
neglect of Chinese language, literature, and history.1'5 3 To 
remedy this situation, the critics of Christian education 
proposed that the Chinese government force all schools to 
register with the Ministry of Education. This would 
establish the amount of control necessary to incorporate 
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the mission schools into the national system of China. 
Attempts to force mission schools to register with the 
Chinese government in the 1920s were not new. The treaty 
between the United Stat~s and China of 4 July 1868 gave 
Americans the right to establish schools in China. But the 
agreement restricted this to ''those places where foreigners 
are by treaty permitted to reside .. " Mission schools built 
in the interior became a part of the treaty controversy 
described above.\'54 The Chinese enacted regulations for 
registration of Christian primary schools as early as 1916. 
Yet few schools registered and the Ministry of Education 
was unable to force compliance.\'5~ 
On 12 May 1917 and 16 November 1920, the Ministry of 
Education issued further proclamations on the registration 
of foreign colleges. These required that mission facil-
ities meet government regulations on years of matriculation 
and designation of schools. They did not address the issue 
of curriculum content. The proclamations provided that 
upon registration, the Christian school graduates would 
enjoy the same privileges as graduates of government 
schools.\'56 
The Ministry of Education issued an order on the 
registration of Christian middle schools on 9 April 1921 
that set the agenda for the debate in the following years. 
This proclamation required the missionaries to add the word 
"private" to their schools' i:iames. It also mandated that 
Chinese standards would apply to the curricula of all 
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middle schools and alterations would need approval. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Education ordered that "the 
content of the curriculum and the methods of teaching shall 
include nothing in the nature of the propagation of reli-
g ion." The missionaries were also required to disregard 
religious affiliation in the treatment of students.~7 
Because of the weakness of China's warlord governments 
during this period, no mission schools felt compelled to 
register. The University of Nanjing "voluntarily" regis-
tered in 1920 under regulations that did not alter its 
curriculum.~8 During 1924, as the intensity of the anti-
Christian movement increased, so did the pressure on 
mission schools to register. 
At the annual meeting of the Chinese National Federa-
tion of Provincial Educational Associations in October 
1924, the delegates adopted a comprehensive program aimed 
at controlling Christian education. The proposals included 
the stipulation that all foreign schools must register with 
the Ministry of Education. Both national and local 
governments should have control of all schools. Schools 
not qualified to register must close after a certain grace 
period. Celebrations and ceremonies should conform to 
government regulations. To the missionaries the most 
objectionable proposal was that foreigners must not use 
schools to propagate religion.~• 
In response to these recommendations and the increas-
ing pressure of anti-Christianity, the Ministry of Educa-
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tion issued another set of regulations on registration. 
The proclamation of 16 Noxember 1925 replaced all other 
orders and applied to all levels of education. These 
regulations were similar to the proposals of the National 
Federation of Provincial Educational As•ociation. To 
establish Chinese control over the mission schools, the 
regulations required that presidents or principals must be 
Chinese. Those schools that had boards of directors or 
managers must designate that a majority of these be 
Chinese. The educational purpose could not be the propag,a-
tion of religion and required subjects could not include 
religion courses.• 0 
While the Ministry of Education in Beijing attempted 
to gain control of Christian education for the northern 
government, the rival Nationalist government in Guangzhou 
took similar action. In November 1926, the KMT issued its 
regulations for private schools. These resembled the 
Beijing provisions but had more restrictions. Under these 
regulations, mission schools were considered the same as 
all other private schools. The Nationalists set specific 
/ 
dates for registration in Guangdong and Hunan provinces. 
All schools were to teach classes on the principles of Sun 
Vat-sen and every Monday morning conduct a memorial service 
in front of Sun's portrait or picture. 61 
The northern government was too weak to enforce any of 
its regulations concerning Christian education. Yet the 
Northern Expedition of the Nationalists proved they were 
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capable of controlling education in China. In 1927 foreign 
Christian workers became concerned about the possibility of 
losing their institutions. 
In January the CCEA sent E.W. Wallace, a Christian 
educator, to meet with the Central Educational Commission 
of the Nationalist government. His task was to obtain a 
clear statement of the policy of the KMT towards Christian 
education. Representatives of the commission told Wallace 
that the KMT was only bpposed to Christi.anity's connection 
to imperialism. When the Chinese eliminated imperialism, 
then the anti-Christian campaign would stop.•a 
The United States Department of State also tried to 
bolster the position of the missionaries. It maintained 
that mission schools were exempt from the authority of the 
KMT under th~ provisions of extraterritoriality. In 
November 1929, it reversed this position admitting it was 
within the rights of the Chinese government .to require 
registration. 6 :::1 
The CCEA again approached the Central Education 
Commission in July 1927. It asked the ministry to define 
/ 
the term, "regain educational rights." At that time, the 
missionaries were especially concerned about KMT confisca-
tion of school property. The commission denied that it was 
the intention of the Chinese government to arbitrarily take 
property. It maintained that the actions of individuals 
were responsible for the problems and issued a warning to 
those occupying mission property.•4 
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Despite. these efforts, there was much confusion in the 
ranks of the missionaries on government registration. Five 
Christian colleges closed for the fall semester in 1927. 
One-half of the middle schools in eastern China and all in 
central China closed that' year .c.1'5 Of seven theological 
seminaries, only three remained open.•• As late as June 
1929, only two colleges had registered, but the majority 
had made application. A majority of Christian middle 
schools had also applied."" 7 
There were other important aspects of registration in 
addition to anti-Christianity and anti-foreignism. At the 
1926 meeting of the CCEA, Christian educators admitted 
their graduates incurred disadvantages because their 
schools had not registered. Chinese from unregistered 
middle schools were not eligible for entrance to governmeht 
colleges. They also could not apply for government 
scholarships for study abroad. Graduates of unregistered 
middle schools were "liable to political disfranchisement" 
because diplomas from those schools did not receive the 
government's stamp. The possession of a stamped middle 
school diploma was "the most general qualific~tion for the 
franchise. "<!:>e 
Issues other than registration conf~onted the Chris-
tian educators during this period. Missionaries began to 
consider the problem of rural education, an area they had 
long neglected. One missionary believed his predecessors 
thought the country was not the ~lace to send th~ best 
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educated Christian men and women. This was "something 
radically wrong in the policy and program of organized 
Christianity in China.""'""'"' In 1924 there were only "thirty 
odd agricultural missionaries in China." 7 .-::> 
Missionaries were extremely sensitive to the attempts 
of the Chinese to eliminate mandatory religious education 
from their schools. Religious education was a vital part 
of th~ mission school curriculum. The Burton commission 
defined the goal of religious education as giving "such 
instruction and training as shall inform the mind in 
respect to morals and religion, secure conversion, and 
develop character." The commission criticized the effec-
tiveness of religious education in China and called for 
improvements in the "principles and methods" of instruc-
tion. The report also recommended the creation of an 
actual "Christian educational system" through greater 
cooperation. 71 
One reason for these criticisms was the failing 
ability of the mission schools to produce Chinese Chris-
ti ans. Particularly troubling was the low number of 
Chinese students willing to enter the ministry. In 1913, 
87 percent of the graduates from the fourteen Christian 
colleges were Christians; 65 percent entered church service 
and 20 percent became ministers. 72 
By 1920 the number of Chinese interested in becoming 
ministers had dropped substantially. At that time, there 
were thirteen seminaries representing twenty-six missionary 
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societies. There were only ninety-six students studying at 
the college level in these institutions. The seminaries 
were producing an average of thirty-two Chinese ministers a 
year. This was less than 2 percent of total Chinese 
students in mission colleges. 7~ 
Anti-Christianity in the 1920s further eroded the 
ability of the missionaries to produce proteges. At 
Yanjing University, a leading American Christian institu-
tion, the Christians in the student body dropped from 88 
percent to 63 percent between 1924 and 1926. By 1935 only 
31 percent of the students were Christians. In the years 
1917 to 1922, one-sixth of the university's graduates were 
from the school of religion. 
in the years 1927 to 1931. 7~ 
This dropped to one-twelfth 
Many Chinese Christians supported radical changes in 
Christian education; this added to the dilemma of the 
missionaries. Chinese Christians favored the registration 
of mission schools, regulations against compulsory relig-
ious education and ceremonies, and more involvement for 
themselves in administration. 7~ They were especially 
critical of seminary education in China. Chinese Chris-
tians believed seminary graduates received poor training 
which emphasized the wrong subjects. Djang Fang, a Chinese 
Christian, argued ''theological training cannot satisfy the 
needs of the peop 1 e, whether urban or rur a 1. "7 ,'!:• 
The campaign against mission schools struck at the 
very.heart of the missionary enterprise. Missionaries 
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hoped to use education as an effective tool to transform 
China into a modern "Christian" nation. Many believed this 
goal was in jeopardy after Chinese nationalism attacked the 
institution of Christian education. 77 
Indigenous Christianity 
Chinese Christians replaced foreigners as administra-
tors of mission schools and church leaders during the 
missionary evacuation of 1927. The missionaries were 
unsure what their position would be when and if they 
returned to China .. The evacuation accomplished what the 
missionaries had for years claimed as their goal. "Indige-
nous Christianity" was the term the missionaries used to 
describe the state of Protestantism they desired to create 
in China. For decades they had placed the accomplishment 
of this goal somewhere in a. vaguely defined "future." 
were astounded when they realized "as the result of the 
evacuation of missionaries it actually torik only about 
three weeks. u-,.e 
Many 
Missionaries filled their correspondence, journals, 
and books with stories, articles, and polemics on indige-
nous Christianity. As early as 1861 the Ameri~an Board 
espoused the policy that "it seems undesirable that 
missionaries should wholly occupy a heathen country." The 
churches in the mission field should develop their own 
self-reliance and enterprise. 79 When the Laymen's Inquiry 
conducted its investigation of ~issions in China in 1931, 
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it found that little "indigenization" had occurred.e:J•:) 
Indigenous Christianity meant churches in China would 
be self-supporting, self-propagating, and self-governing. 
Indigenous Christianity would ideally conform "as far as 
possible in doctrine, forms of worship, and organization, 
to Chinese rather than to Occidental traditions. 11 m1 The 
Chinese delegation to the meeting of the International 
Missionary Council at Jerusalem in 1928 defined what the 
term meant to Chinese Christians. Indigenous Christianity 
would be "adapted to meet the religious needs of the 
Chinese people, most congenial to Chinese life and culture, 
and most effective in arousing in Chinese Christians a 
sense of responsibility. 119s 
' The goal of "indigenization" had important conse-
quences for both ~issionaries ~nd their converts. In 
indigenous churches, Chinese would assume the traditional 
role of most missionaries. The China delegation at 
Jerusalem stated: "In all the problems of the Church's 
faith and order, its government, finance and propagation, 
Chinese initiative should have entirely free course." 19 ~·~ 
This issue concerned much of the vested interests of 
the missionary enterprise that developed during the Chris-
tian century. Under the auspices of indigenous Christi-
anity, Chinese would replace missionaries as the leaders of 
the churches. Financial support would be generated in 
China instead of in the West. Mission property worth 
millions of dollars would transfer to Chinese ownership. 
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And, ideally, a form of Protestantism recognized as 
"Chinese" would lead China into the modern world as a 
"Christian" nation. 
Foreign Protestants in China traditionally said the 
development of replacements for themselves, or devolution, 
was essential to their mission. Between 1858 and 1900 no 
progress in this area occurred. Latourette apologizes for 
this failure by asserting that "the creation of a body of 
well-prepared, able men and women was, however, no easy 
task and not one to be accomp 1 i shed in a few decades." ;;;i<+ 
After the turn of the century, missionaries became more 
concerned about the lack of capable Chinese Christian 
leaders. Beginning with a national conference of Prates-
tants in 1913, all large gatherings of missionaries 
addressed this issue. 9~ 
The small numbers of Chinese who became ministers 
justified this concern. In 1915 there were only 764 
ordained Chinese in the churches. This number increased 70 
percent to 1,305 in 1920, and Chinese then outnumbered 
ordained foreigners (1,268). 96 Yet the survey, Christian 
I 
Occupation of China, conducted in 1921 found that foreign-
ers still controlled two-thirds of the ecclesiastical 
leadership. 97 Milton Stauffer, editor of the survey, 
lamented that "it must, nevertheless, be admitted that the 
influence of the missionary is still strong, and in many 
cases dominate, notwithstanding that he is in the minor-
i ty. "sEi Stauffer repeated the traditional rhetoric that 
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devolution was the goal of the missionaries. To accomplish 
this, Chinese Christian leaders "must be trained, have 
increased self-determination and so guide more and more the 
policies of the Christian Church. 116 ";> The "Survey Volume" 
set the agenda for the 1920s debate over Chinese leadership 
of the churches. 
For Chinese Christians the issue of control was 
primary. In 1927 David Z.T. Yui assessed the missionaries' 
efforts and.pr~ised their beneficial org~nizations and 
institutions. He pointed out, however, that "the chief 
objection to them is the foreign control under which they 
have been operating."'9'-~ The Laymen's Inquiry also found 
that i.n the problem of indigenous Christianity "the Chinese 
tend to regar~ control as crucial and all else as inci-
dental. "'7' 1 
Between 1918 and 1927 Chinese Christians repeatedly 
suggested ways in which church leadership should devolve in 
the China missions. They maintained Chinese we~e ready, 
willing, and able to support the Christian work in their 
country. 9 e When missionaries stated there was a lack of 
capable leaders, the Chinese replied this was partially 
caused by the foreigners. Some Chinese leaders left the 
churches because they found it difficult to work with the 
missionaries."" 3 Missionaries desired passive "helpers" and 
the "mission system has not been successful in producing 




Financial independence was closely associated with the 
issue of Chinese control of the churches. For many 
missionaries, indigenous Christianity by definition 
included complete financial support by Chinese Christians. 
Some advocated that administrative autonomy be predicated 
upon financial independence. 95 Those who took this posi-
tion emphasized past experiences that includEd the corrupt 
practices of some Chinese Christians and their poor record 
in giving . 9 <!:> 
Western churches were very generous in financially 
supporting the missionary enterprise in China. After the 
adoption of the goals of the social gospel in the twentieth 
century, missionaries sp~nt vast sums on schools and other 
institutions. These facilities wer~ beyond the capability 
of Chinese Christians to pay for or maintain.•7 Some 
Chinese proposed that support from the West continue and 
they be given control of the funds.• 0 
Another problem involving money was the transfer of 
mission property to Chinese ownership. C.Y. Cheng saw the 
"material equipment" of the missions as "a s.erious problem 
to the Chinese Church. It is neither easy to give up nor 
to keep up. 11 •• Other Chinese Christians maintained the 
property actually belonged to the. "Christian movement in 
China." Its administration should be by boards of trustees 
with foreign and Chinese members. 100 
This issue was particularly troubling for foreign 
Christian workers. Some asserted that the Chinese did not 
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have the resour~es to maintain property and habitually 
neglected their own. Others worried about the ability of 
Chinese Christians to protect the churches from corrupt 
government practices such as illegal taxation. The most 
acceptable solution included gradual transfer using joint 
boards of trustees. These would guarantee the maintenance 
of the property and insure that it continued to function 
for the original purposes. 101 
The question of "Chinese" Protestantism was more 
difficult to define than leadership, financial support, or 
property transfer. Other than Chinese dominance in these 
areas, many missionaries were unsure what indigenous 
Christianity should entail. Some argued that Christianity 
would be indigenous when the Chinese "have absorbed the 
principles of Christianity, and interpreted them into 
Oriental terms of philosophy, organization and living. 111 <:• 1=-
0thers believed building churches that conformed to Chinese 
architectural style was a step towards "indigenization." 
They questioned the wisdom of erecting ''Mid-Victorian-
Gothic" chapels in the midst of Chinese cities. 103 
Some foreign Christian workers believed inner values, 
not outward forms, were important indicators of progress in 
the adaptation of their religion. They observed the 
tendency of the Chinese "towards almost Quaker simplicity." 
This disaffection for ''the Anglo-desire for control, [and] 
Western worship of efficiency and organization" caused them 
to question the need to transfer Western institutions and 
ecclesiastical structures to China. 104 
Rawlinson maintained that the primary question for 
missionaries was "whether or not the movement for an 
indigenous church endangers Christian values." In fact, 
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there was no agreement on what these values were. Yet 
"some express doubt as to whether or not the Chinese church 
is ethically or spiritually strong enough to guard these 
Christian values. 11105 Some mi.ssionaries feared an indig-
enous church in China would be a syncretic cult. Rawlinson 
pointed out that Christianity was already "the product of 
syncret i c readjustment. 111 '=> 0 
Chinese nationalism in the 1920s did not create the 
issues of indigenous Christianity but it did magnify their 
importance. The Laymen's Inquiry reported "the national-
istic movement had repercussions in the mind of the native 
church especially in regard to the matter of responsibility 
and control."J.(.>7 In 1919 Rawlinson observed a new "candid-
ness" on the part of Chinese Christian leaders. He 
believed this indicated "an increasing determination to 
take a fuller part in the control of things affecting 
Chinese.••ioe As the missionaries addressed these issues 
during this critical decade, the plight of indigenous 
Christianity in China became apparent. 
Indigenous Christianity incorporated all of the 
problems of the missionary enterprise in China. Because 
indigenous meant independent, this was a threat to the 
vested interests of the missionaries. Chinese control of 
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foreigners, tariffs, churches, ,schools, and theology in 
China were issues of Chinese national sovereignty. The 
American men and women who confronted these issues believed 
their solution would determine the salvation of a quarter 
of the world's population. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MISSIONARIES AND CHINESE NATIONALISM: 
THE RESPONSES 
The issues of Chinese nationalism that directly 
affected the missionaries in the 1920s were critical to the 
development of Christianity in China. In addressing the 
problems of treaty revision, educational autonomy, and 
devolution of church administration, the missionaries 
determined the future of Christia~ity in China. Christian 
theology, Western culture, and international politics 
influenced the decisions the missionaries made on these 
problems. Despite the limiting circumstances the mission-
aries dealt with, alternative solutions were available. 
The ways in which the missionaries chose to respond had 
consequences for themselves and their followers. Their 
responses to these issues reveal the missionaries' failure 
to successfully meet the challenge of Chinese nationalism. 
Missionaries, as individuals, responded to the 
problems of Chinese nationalism in different ways. Yet, as 
members of religious organizations, they were not free to 
pursue independent solutions. Each denominational agency 
with workers in China made policy decisions on how to 
respond to the new conditions in the field. The adminis-
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trators on the church boards that controlled the missions 
based their policies on information received from the 
missionaries. Through thi~ process, the responses of the 
majority of the missionaries prevailed over any divergent 
minority opinions. During the critical decade of the 
1920s, a conservative consensus emerged that resisted 
radical change and favored maintaining the missionary 
enterprise intact. 
Chinese Christians reacted differently than their 
missionary leaders to the events of this period. On some 
issues, they contributed to the criticisms and demands for 
change the missionaries confronted. Chinese Christians 
considered how nationalism related to their "foreign" 
religion and how to respond to the various charges of the 
anti-Christians. Many decided that patriotism did not 
conflict with their religious beliefs. They became vocal 
supporters of change in Chinese Christianity as well as in 
other Chinese institutions. The responses of Chinese 
Christians to the issues of nationalism generally conflict-
ed with those of foreign Christian workers. 
May Fourth Nationalism 
Christian involvement in politics affected many other 
issues of this period. The May Fourth Movement signified 
the increasing importance of po,litics in the 1920s. After 
the failure of the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919, Chinese Christians, like other Chinese, 
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became more conscious of international politics. Some 
Chinese Christians criticized missionaries for their 
failure to condemn Japanese aggression in China. 1 In a 
letter to the editor of the Chinese Recorder, Liu Pu-chi 
advocated participation of Christians in May Ninth memorial 
ceremonies. He believed "the Church has the duty of 
teaching personal and social justice, as well as interna-
tional justice. 1112 
In the early 1920s, many missionaries believed that 
Christians should not become involved in politics.~ 
Although John Leighton Stuart disagreed with this view, he 
admitted he had to censor what he wrote in the China 
Mission Year Book. He thought the time was right for the 
missionary body to "reexamine its convictions as to the 
national and international bearings of its message.'"+ 
The YMCA's "Good Citizenship Week" was an example of 
the missionaries' ambivalent attitudes toward politics. 
This event in Guangzhou in 1924 was an attempt to redirect 
Chinese hostility on the anniversary of May Fourth and May 
Ninth. In reporting this, the editor of the Chinese 
Recorder reassured his readers that "care was taken that 
the movement should not meddle in party politics." 
Christians could participate "without getting anywhere near 
.• 
those vexing [political] questions which so quickly chill 
our sp i r i ts . " 111!; 
There were exceptions among the missionaries on the 
issue of political involvement. Roland Cross translated 
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the speeches of President Wilson during World War I and 
distributed them to Chinese in Beijing. He believed in 
protesting any United States actions that conflicted with 
the best interests of the Chinese. The American Board 
warned Cross for participating in this activity telling 
him: "Don't identify democracy with Christianity.""""' 
The concerns of the missionaries on political ques-
tions increased as the significance of the May Fourth 
Movement became apparent. Before the student demonstra-
tions on 4 May 1919, missionaries called attention to the 
"nationalistic spirit" in China. Many missionaries began 
to emphasize the idea that Christianity could guide the 
forces of nationalism in the right direction •. ,,. The editors 
of the China Mission Year Book, 1919 believed the student 
movement had made it a memorable year. The new nationalism 
"if wisely directed may well usher in a new day in China."~9 
Between 1919 and 1925, missionaries saw a new oppor-
tunity as a result of May Fourth nationalism. China had 
rejected Christianity for a hundred years but now Chinese 
were "willing listeners and the Christian forces are 
mobilizing to take advantage of the great opportunity." 9 
One Christian educator wanted to teach her students a flag 
salute, even if it was a "good translation of the American 
one. 11 :1.(~ 
Frank Rawlinson, editor cf the Chinese Recorder, 
advised missionaries on how to become involved in the May 
Fourth Movement. Churches should not participate but 
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Christians as individuals could address "the moral ideas of 
national righteousness." Missionaries must not engage in 
partisan politics and should discourage strikes and any 
type of violence. A missionary could "give the benefit of 
his judgment on the moral aspects of such movements." As 
leaders of the Christian community, missionaries should 
assist in the discussion of "national questions of moral 
significance among Christians. 1111 
Some missionaries believed Christianity caused the May 
Fourth Movement. P.F. Price maintained that "the Christian 
movement has been the largest cause of the present intel-
lectual awakening." Use of the vernacular language, modern 
educational methods, scientific inquiry, and freedom bf 
speech and thought were the characteristics of the New 
Thought <May Fourth) Movement. Missionaries had tradition-
ally stressed these aspects in their work. 1 ~ Herman Bly 
agreed that missionaries helped to introduce science and 
technology into China and these were important parts of 
this movement. Other missionaries asserted that Chris-
tianity was responsible for the nationalism of young 
Chinese. 1 ;9 
Chinese Christians also viewed the activity of China's 
young intellectuals during this period as an opportunity 
for Christianity. They supported many of the goals of the 
May Fourth Movement including use of the vernacular, 
popular education, and increasing nationalism. Chinese 
Christians did not approve of the anti-Christian and anti-
religion trends in the movement. 
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They hoped young Chinese 
would give Christianity a. "chance to prove its worth." 
Chinese Christians admired the critical spirit of May 
Fourth and believed they could learn from this. Y.T. Wu 
advised fellow Christians to maintain an open mind towards 
new ideas and engage in introspective meditation. Adopting 
some of the new criticism, Wu wrote: "Half of the mistakes 
that missions and Churches have made may be said to be due 
to the lack of Chinese leadership.":L«· 
Wu's remark was an omen of future conflict. The 
majority of missionaries eMdorsed the May Fourth Movement 
only tentatively. In 1922 Rawlinson realized that the 
success of the new nationalism would mean changes in China 
missions. Eventually, Chinese churches would control 
Christian work in China. In this altered situation, 
missionaries would have to stop "expressing our Christian-
ity in our nationalistic terms" and "respond to a call for 
service in terms of the national 1 ife of those who cal 1. ":tr:5 
Although this was the expressed goal of the mission-
aries, Rawlinson was apprehensive about some aspects of the 
"new Christian movement." He wrote in 1923: Christianity 
in China ''threatens to become hyper-nationalistic and is in 
danger of minimizing the international significance of 
Christian brotherhood.'' 16 Despite this doubt, Rawlinson 
remained a strong supporter of many of the intellectual 
trends of May Fourth. On the eve of renewed anti-Christian 
campaigns in 1924, he advised missionaries to "welcome the 
taking up by strong [Chinese] Christians of national 
responsibility."J.7 
The May Thirtieth Incident 
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Missionaries had varying opinions about the serious-
ness of the anti-Christian movement in late 1924 and early 
1925. At that time, A.J. Bowen sent questionnaires to 
twenty-one missionary friends in order to survey the 
prevailing conditions. He reported that "the replies 
indicate the disturbed conditions have hindered in varying 
degrees the work of the missions." 3.e:i In January 1925 the 
American Consul-General at Shanghai questioned both 
missionaries and businessmen ~bout rumors of increasing 
anti-foreignism. Their answers indicated there had been no 
radical change in the attitudes of Chinese but there was 
some agitation in the Christian scho6ls. 19 
Many missionaries were not overly concerned about 
anti-foreignism, anti-Christianity, and increasing nation-. 
alism before 30 May 1925. They remained optimistic about 
guiding the new "nationalistic spirit" in a Christian 
direction that would benefit both themselves and their 
followers. The tragedy at Shanghai and its aftermath 
quickly captured the missionaries' attention and altered 
the position of Christianity in China forever. 
Christian leaders in Shanghai cabled John Mott in New 
York on 19 June 1925 advising him of the situation. These 
men emphasized the magnitude of Chinese anger over the 
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Shanghai shootings. The missionaries argued an American 
show of force would be disastrous and advised Mott to do 
all he could to prevent this. They agreed with the Chinese 
demands for an impartial investigation by an international 
board that included Chinese representatives. Mott subse-
quently forwarded their cable to President Coolidge.IE 0 
In July the Chinese Recorder reprinted several letters 
from groups of missionaries to Chinese Christians. The 
Missionary Associations in Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang 
<Mukden), Changsha, and the Shanghai YWCA expressed regret 
over the incident. All the foreign Christian workers 
supported an impartial investigation that would include 
both Chinese and foreign judges.IE 1 
The Shanghai association was concerned about transmit-
ting accurate information to the home mission boards and 
welcomed all unbiased accounts of the tragedy. The 
Changsha missionaries believed ''long-standing and deep-
seated racial misunderstandings" were ultimately respons-
ible for the shooting~. The missionaries in Shenyang 
predicted the event would end extraterritoriality and 
·' advised all foreigners to prepare to surrender their 
privileges.i::.e 
The efforts of Chinese Christians to affect politics 
in China increased after the May Thirtieth Incident. Two 
days after the shootings, a mass meeting of Chinese Chris-
tians in Shanghai adopted "vigorous demands for redressing 
China's wrongs." The Christians published these in the 
local press and sent copies to provincial and national 
government offices.~~ 
Chinese Christians began to organize "Christian 
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Unions" in Shanghai and other large cities. These cooper-
ated with the general public in the various anti-
imperialist and anti-capitalist movements. The unions 
issued manifestos, raised money for strike funds, and 
organized study sessions on the problems of Sino-foreign 
relations. They also distributed tracts and pamphlets in 
attempts tci disseminate "correct" information on current 
events. The Christian Union~ supported revision of the 
"unequal" treaties. Some members believed "that not a few 
missionaries by their reliance on military protection are 
compromising the position of the Chinese Church.""~~+ 
When the May Thirtieth Incident remained unresolved, 
missionaries became more vocal in their support of the 
Chinese. Missionaries of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 
including Bishop L.J. Birney, sent a letter to the United 
States Secretary of State approving the calling of confer-
ences on tariffs and extraterritoriality. The Methodists 
expressed confidence in the ability of the Chinese to solve 
the present problems. They pledged to support Chinese 
efforts "in so far as they do not lead us into interference 
with China's political affairs."<=!!5 
One missionary showed his support by participating in 
a Chinese demonstration against foreigners. Clemens 
Granskou and his family were the only foreigners living in 
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Guangshan in the summer of 1925. When the Chinese asked 
him to march in their parade denouncing the Shanghai 
incident, he agreed. Granskou believed this indicated the 
Chinese held no personal animosity against him as an 
American. They were protesting the policies of Western 
nations that had existed since the Opium War. Because he 
also opposed these policies, Granskou did not consider his 
participation a betrayal of his citizenship. He hoped 
mi.ssionaries would try to understand the feelings of the 
Chinese and that "somehow the Chinese would appreciate that 
we were their friends rather than their enemies."<=c-• 
By the end of 1925, many missionaries realized the May 
Thirtieth Incident was a critical juncture in the long 
struggle to create a Christian China. Under the title 
"What Do the Chinese Want?" F'rank Rawlinson condensed all 
demands to one word: "autonomy." He believed the Chinese 
wanted autonomy in every aspect of their lives. To 
accomplish this would require changes in the international 
treaties. Educational autonomy and "administrative 
autonomy in church life" meant alterations in the mission-
ary enterprise in China. Rawlinson thought "this urge for 
autonomy and liberty is the logical result of the Christian 
emphasis on the equality of value of individuals and 
races. 111-= 7 
Revision of the "Unequal" Treaties 
Because the United States agreed in 1903 to consider 
treaty renegotiation when China attained the proper 
internal conditions, missionaries occasionally discussed 
treaty revision. A few missionaries supported treaty 
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revision before the May Thirtieth Incident. They debated 
how treaty revision would affect their work. As anti-
foreignism and anti-Christianity increased in 1924 and 
1925, foreign Christian workers gave more attention to this 
politically volatile question. 28 
In March 1925, American Board missionaries of the 
North China Mission began an effort to encourage the United 
States to revise the treaties. Out of a total of 134 
missionaries in this association, 109 signed a statement 
addressed to their home board in Boston. They asked that 
the mission administrators do all in their power to 
persuade the State Department to pursue renegotiations. 
The American Board workers also asked the National Chris-
tian Council, a coordinating body for Chinese churches, to 
approach Western diplomats on the issue. 29 
The majority of missionaries in China joined the 
movement for treaty revision after the May Thirtieth 
Incident. From the middle of 1925 until the end of 1926, 
associations and groups of missionaries drafted proposals 
advocating new i.nternational agreements be made between 
China and foreign nations. Justifications for this 
reversal of the traditional missionary position on the 
"unequal" treaties varied."'10 
Foreign Christian workers were specifically concerned 
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with the protection of Christianity afforded by the 
toleration clauses. They also realized their privileges 
under extraterritoriality offended the Chinese. For the 
majority of missionaries, revision of the treaties meant 
ending all advantages for foreigners in China. Mission-
aries advocated new conditions in which Christian and 
commercial interests would depend ~ntirely upon Chinese law 
for protection. This resulted in conflict between mission-
aries and businessmen over the abolition of extrater-
r i tori a 1 i ty. :=1 1 
A.L. Warnshuis, Secretary of the International 
Missionary Council, argued that missionaries should work 
for treaty revision because they had been instrumental in 
obtaining the original agreements. -- . He urged missionaries 
"to use whatever knowledge and influence" they now pas-
sessed in an effort to renegotiate the treaties. Unlike 
the old agreements, the new treaties should "more truly 
express the Christian principles that ought to prevail in 
international relations." Some foreigners asserted that 
without extraterritoriality they would be subject to the 
corruption of Chinese officia.ls, primarily the practice of 
"squeeze." Warnshuis believed this already occurred and 
would not increase with the loss of treaty privileges. 3 • 
Another reason for ending extraterritoriality was 
Chinese animosity towards gunboats and foreign concession 
areas. The Chinese associated missionaries with these en-
croachments on their nation's sovereignty. Because 
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missionaries lived near these signs of Western power, they 
were sometimes the targets of violence. Many foreign 
Christians believed it was safer living in the interior 
away from the protection of gunboats. They argued this 
proved extraterritoriality was no longer necessary.~s 
One missionary realistically admitted: "A change is coming 
soon whether we want it or not. Why not yield to the 
i nevi tab le gracefu 11 y? " 3 ~+ 
The inclusion of religious freedom in China's consti-
tutions was another reason missionaries supported abolition 
of the toleration clauses. The Provisional Republican 
Constitution of 10 March 1912 simply stated: "The People 
have liberty of religion."m5 The Permanent Constitution of 
14 May 1917 allowed "citizens of the Republic of China [toJ 
enjoy the liberty • • within limits of law of choosing 
their religions.";:ric. Kenneth Latourette maintained these 
constitutions "were the basic law of the land [and] seemed 
to render invalid some of the arguments that once had been 
advanced for treaty protection. "°'17 
Missionaries who opposed alterations in the treaty 
protection of Christianity offered three main reasons. The 
toleration clauses protected Chinese Christians from 
persecution by other Chinese. Missionaries working in the 
interior would be unsafe without extraterritoriality. 
Because of the political chaos in China, treaty revision 
was premature. Ernest F.P. Scholes urged delaying negotia-
tions for at least three years. With the rhetoric of 
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benevolent paternalism, Scholes concluded: "By reducing 
ourselves to their level we shall reduce ourselves to 
impotence."3 a 
The efforts of the missionaries in China produced 
results in the United States. In late 1925 and early 1926, 
the administrators of the various foreign mission boards 
held meetings and adopted resolutions favoring treaty 
revision. The first of these was an unofficial meeting of 
I. 
eighty-five representatives from thirty-two mission organi-
zations on 2-3 October in New York. This assembly urged 
all denominational mission boards and the United States 
government to take immediate action. The delegates 
proposed the United States revise its treaties with China 
to fulfill the principles of the Nine Power Treaty and the 
Washington Conference of 1922.s• 
Between Octob~r 1925 and January 1926, twenty-one 
denominational mission boards adopted similar resolutions. 
Among these were: American Baptist, Presbyterian Church, 
U.S.A., Methodist Episcopal, ABCFM, Free Methodist Church, 
Reformed Church in the U.S., Church of God, and Seventh Day 
Baptist. These actions became public when the Foreign 
Mission Conference of North America met 12-15 January 1925 
at Atlantic City. The delegates to the conference endorsed 
treaty revision and reaffirmed their denominations' efforts 
to influence the State Department to open negotiations with 
China.•+<:~ 
Missionaries in China knowledgeable of the history of 
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the "unequal" treaties attempted to educate their col-
leagues during this period. Articles outlining the 
development of the missionaries' privileged status appeared 
in the Chinese Recorder and China Christian Year Book. 
Harley Farnsworth MacNair, missionary and professor of 
history, believed missionary training should include 
courses on ethics and international relations. This was 
necessary because "missionaries constitute one of the most 
powerful forces in inter-national relations of the 
present day. " 41· 
Publici~ing the history of missionary involvement in 
treaty negotiations mobilized more support for treaty 
revision. Foreign Christian workers in the 1920s realized 
the participation of their predecessors in obtaining and 
expanding treaty rights was detrimental to their cause. 
They hoped to rectify these past mistakes by abolishing the 
toleration clauses. In calling for renegotiation of the 
Sino-American agreements, missionaries hoped to separate 
themselves from the cursed accusation of imperialism. 
To accomplish this, missionaries attempted to distance 
themselves from their cultural and political heritage. In 
addressing this problem, Methodist Episcopal workers 
admitted that "no nation nor civilization perfectly 
exemplifies Christ's teachings." Missionaries were "not in 
China as the propagandists of any particular type of 
civilization.42 W.J. Mortimore lamented some Chinese 
charged Christianity "with being the agent of that selfish 
125 
capitalism." He believed any benefits of the toleration 
clauses "have been more than nullified by the evil effects 
of this foreign political relationship.11 '+;;3 Clemens 
Granskou recalled: "We began to see that the protection was 
a liability rather than an asset . . extraterritoriality 
was really a thorn in the flesh of the Chinese.""""'·• 
Chinese Christians hoped their support of treaty 
revision would ameliorate their relations with the anti-
Christians. The National Christian Council· surveyed 
Chinese Christian leaders on treaty revision in 1926. On 
the question of church involvement in politics, 171 out of 
275 answers favored participation and 190 favored abolition 
of the toleration clauses. The reasons for abolition 
included: their incompatibility with Christian teachings, 
the guarantee of religious freedom in the constitution, and 
"it would help in dealing with the anti-Christian move-
ment. "'+5 
The editor of the Chinese Recorder questioned Chinese 
Christians on "the place of the missionary in promoting 
international understanding and relationships?" They 
replied missionaries should influence their home govern-
ments to deal justly with the government of China. 
Missionaries needed to "use their influence to have the 
<toleration clauses' abolished." They should also "inter-
pret China to their own countries" better than "diplomats, 
tourists, and merchants do." 4¢• 
The intensity of Chinese nationalism and anti-
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foreignism after the May Thirtieth Incident revealed the 
precarious situation of the missionaries. Criticisms by 
Chinese Christians increased their difficulties. Chinese 
Christians in Qufu found ''it impossible to convince non-
Christians that the missionaries do not believe in the 
doctrine of physical force." They challenged foreign 
Christian workers to issue a statement separating them-
selves from the policies of Western governments. 47 
The majority of missionaries continued to support 
treaty revision after the failure of the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality in 1926 and the success of the Northern 
Expedition of ~he KMT in 1927. 49 The foreign Christian 
workers KMT soldiers attacked in Nanjing on 24 March 1927 
were an exception. They were thankful extraterritoriality 
was still in place and gunboats were nearby to rescue 
them. 49 
When missionaries returned to their stations after the 
1927 evacuation, they explored ways to separate themselves 
from treaty protection. George W. Hollister suggested no 
missionary return who wanted military protection or who did 
not favor abolition of extraterritoriality.~0 R.B. 
I 
Whitaker believed Chinese Christians "take the attitude 
that for missionaries to continue to rely upon foreign 
military protection is to reduce very greatly their 
effectiveness in Christian work." 151 Some missionaries 
tried to voluntarily surrender their extraterritorial 
status and protection of the toleration clauses. The State 
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Department advised that the only way to accomplish this was 
to relinquish American citizenship. Missionaries were not 
willing to db this. The "unequal" treaties remained a 
problem with no obvious solution for the missionaries.~~ 
Historians believe a majority of American missionaries 
favored treaty revision in the 1920s. Latourette maintains 
missionaries were divided on the issue before the May 
Thirtieth I.ncident. After that most mission boards and 
societies adopted specific resolutions calling for renego-
tiation. A majority advocated abolition of the toleration 
~lauses and some addressed the questions of extraterri-
toria.l ity and tariff control. Yet, there was "a fairly 
large minority of missionaries [who] believed that the time 
had not yet come for the removal of ex traterr i tori a 1 i ty. "~!;.:~1 
Yip Ka~che and Dorothy Borg agree that a majority of 
missionaries supported treaty~revision. Yip concludes this 
did not help their cause, however, because the prevalent 
view in China was that missions were connected with imper-
ial ism.54 Borg believes the mission boards in the United 
States took the lead in developing support for renegoti-
at ion. Action by ~issionaries in China was slow in coming 
and not unanimous. AltQough they never conducted an 
accurate survey, missionary leaders in China thought a 
majority of their number advocated treaty revision.~~ 
Paul Varg maintains the missionaries' strongest 
support for renegotiation occurred before the Northern 
Expedition and the March Twenty-Fourth Incident. Following 
this they continued to espouse treaty revision, but 
missionaries no longer "had the same faith as Chinese in 
the virtue of Chinese nationalism." Varg believes after 
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1927 devolution was the major concern of the missionaries 
in China.l'!.> 0 
Control of Christian Education 
The attempts of the Chinese governments to gain 
control of Christian schools in the 1920s were a serious 
threat to the missionary enterprise. Foreign Christians 
believed their educational efforts were of primary impor-
tance in changing Chinese society. Missionaries hoped 
their Christian-educated followers could become leaders in 
China's government as well as in the Chinese churches. The 
anti-Christians' success in making control of mission 
schools an issue of Chinese nationalism jeopardized this 
goal. After the KMT unification of the country, the 
missionaries confronted the problem of surrendering their 
institutions' autonomy or ending Christian education in 
China. 
As part of the Western presence in China, mission 
schools had to defend against the charge of imperialism. 
The editor of the Educational Review warned missionary 
educators in April 1925 not to rely "upon 'treaty rights' 
for the maintenance of the Christian schools." This would 
encourage the belief that the schools were agents of 
imperialism and "that would be fatal." After two troubled 
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years, the editor admitted, Christian education ''in too 
many cases, is in a strategically false and vulnerable 
position." It was easy for Chinese "who desire its 
destruction to make it appear to be one of the enemies of 
national salvation."l'!'i7 
One of the goals of the movement against mission 
schools was the elimination of compulsory religion courses 
from the curriculum. Christian teachers attributed this to 
the influence of secularization of education in the West 
and Japan. They believed "French and Japanese trained 
Chinese educators and certain visiting educators and 
writers from America and England have helped to deepen this 
conviction."l'!'it'!I This resulted in attacks from the "front 
and rear." Chinese intellectuals criticized Christian 
education because of their traditional rationalistic 
tendencies. When Chinese teachers accepted Western 
secularization, this reinforced their criticisms. Mission-
aries lamented that "Chinese rationalistic tendencies plus 
western sec:ularization make a formidable combination."l':!i"? 
Missionaries realized there were problems in their 
educational institutions in the early 1920s. F.L. Hawks 
Pott, President of the CCEA, was concerned about the 
effects of the New Thought Movement on Christian schools in .. 
1922. Pott believed the critical.outlook of China's young 
intellectuals required Christian education to revise its 
traditional dogmatism. He advised teachers to adopt the 
"use of the inductive method in teaching all subjects of 
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the curriculum." Teaching should include class discussions 
and an "open forum." Pott warned missionaries that "it 
will be sad if the Christian educators prove more conserva-
tive than these advocates of the new literary movement."<!:• 0 
Other missionary criticisms of Christian schools 
included the weakness of religious education, the use of 
poorly trained teachers, lack of organization, and the 
"foreignness" of the institutions. In denigrating religion 
courses, William L. Sanders charged there was "poor 
teaching of the Bible, lack of a well-defined aim, and a 
dead formalism." He admitted "our Bible teachers teach 
like parrots. 11 <!:>1 
The Christian Educational Commission in 1922 found 
that nearly all mission schools were "conducted by teach_i::?rs 
and principals without special professional training for 
their tasks." It recommended Christian educators develop a 
better organized system and pay adequate salaries to 
attract better teachers. The commissioners were "surprised 
by the foreign complexion of the work." They suggested the 
missionaries give more responsibility to the Chinese and 
include Chinese language and literature in the curric-
ulum. 6 0: 
The use of English was a chronic and pervasive problem 
.. 
in missionary education. Christian colleges relied on 
English for instruction beginning in the first year. In 
order to develop the required proficiency, middle schools 
had to devote a substantial amount of teaching time to 
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Eng 1 i sh. This resulted in an unbalanced curriculum at the 
middle-school level and Christian colleges that excluded 
the majority of Chinese students. 63 John Leighton Stuart 
noticed that disorganization in Christian education 
compounded this problem. Students from Christian middle 
schools often failed to pass the college entrance examina-
tions. Other important problems were the failure of 
Christian schools to produce Christian men and women and 
the failure of the best students to go into the ministry. 64 
Chinese Christians also faulted the mission schools. 
T.Z. Koo accused both churches and schools of remaining 
aloof from Chinese society. He observed that "some Chris-
tian institutions even pride themselves on the fact that 
they have nothing to do with government schools." Koo 
counted only five Christian student groups in the one 
thousand ninety-six Chinese middle schools in +924. He 
suggested the missionaries put more effort into a student 
Christian movement. 6~ Chinese Christians criticized 
missionary educators for their inability to understand the 
patriotic movement. They also found Christian teachers' 
ignorance of Chinese history, literature, and language 
particularly offensive.•• 
The missionaries' followers particularly disliked 
compulsory religion classes and religious exercises in the 
schools. Roland Cross, who conducted classes for Chinese 
ministers, discovered they thought "students should not be 
compelled to attend worship." To attract the students, 
"every effort should' be put forth to make the services 
.interesting.".-!:• 7 King Chu argued that "the compulsory 
system does not suit Chinese sentiment.0 Most Chinese 
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considered religion to be a matter of personal choice. 
Compu.lsory religious education "may go on smoothly with the 
uneducated Chinese" but this only proc;!uced "rice Chris-
tians."66 
The campaign against mission schools intensified after 
the May Thirtieth Incident at Shanghai in 1925. Student 
strikes, demonstrations, or other forms of disruption 
affected at least eighty-eight schools between June 1925 
and May 1926. These attacks intimidated Chinese Christians 
and they became "unwi 11 i ng to express their faith pub 1 i c-
1 y •II Membership in the YMCA dropped and thousands of 
students left the Christian schools. 0 • 
As the fervor of nationalism and anti-foreignism 
increased, registration with the Chinese government became 
the consuming problem for the Christian educators. In an 
attempt to avoid further conflict, the General Board of the 
CCEA approved the principle of registration in April 1925. 
The board recommended mission schools register with local 
or central government authorities as soon as possible. 
However, the CCEA suggested the schools not register if 
that action would affect the "special function of the 
Christian schools. 1170 
The missionaries were most concerned with government 
regulations on curriculum and purpose of the schools. The 
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Ministry of Education proclamation bf 16 November 1925, 
Article 5, disallowed the propagation of religion as the 
aim of any registered school. Article 6 prohibited 
religion courses or religious exercises in the required 
curriculum. The editor of the Educational Review believed 
mission schools could avoid the regulation on propagation 
of religion. He claimed the aim of Christian education was 
the development of the student's character. Yet the ban on 
compulsory religion in the schools was a difficulty that 
"must be frankly faced." 71 
Throughout 1926 Christian educators debated the 
implications of registering with the Ministry of Education. 
This issue was the sole topic of discussion at the annual 
conference of the CCEA held at Shanghai on 3-8 May 1926. 
The majority of delegates agreed in principle with regis-
tration but there was dissension over the specific require-
ments of the regulations. Many believed Article 5 techni-
cally excluded Christian ed~cation. Other delegates feared 
that support from the home churches would be lost if the 
Christian colleges surrendered ''their distinctive religious 
character." 7 1.:!! 
Chinese Christians at the conference cautioned their 
foreign colleagues not to reject registration too quickly . 
. . 
They urged the missionaries to prove "that these institu-
tions exist to serve Chinese youth by their acceptance of a 
relation to the national educational authorities through 
registration." The delegates did not reach a consensus on 
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the issue and passed no resolutions on registration. 7~ 
The majority of Chinese Christians favored registra-
tion. Chinese who worked at or attended mission schools 
were targets of anti-Christianity and anti-foreignism. The 
anti-Christians accused them of being part of Western 
imperialism. Chinese Christians hoped. that when the 
mission schools registered with the Ministry of Education 
the anti-Christians would end their attacks. They also 
believed it was within the rights of the Chinese government 
to control educational institutions inside China. 74 
Some missionaries adamantly supported compulsory 
religion in the Christian schools. They opposed registra-
tion under reg~lations that prohibited this. These 
teachers maintained that education without requiced classes 
~ .. ---
in religion and mandatory chapel attendance was not 
Christian education. If Chinese wanted to avoid religion 
they should attend other schools. One foreign Christian 
worker asserted that compulsory functions in the mission 
schools taught Chinese students discipline and they 
particularly needed that lesson. 7~ Many of the Christian 
educators who favored religious requirements decided they 
would close their schools rather than submit to the Chinese 
government's regulations. 7 b 
Christian teachers who believed required religion was 
unnecessary in mission schools argued that compulsion 
hindered rather than helped Christianity. All education 
worked better when students made their own decisions. 
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These educators proposed alternative plans which included 
allowing students to attend "ethics" classes and substi-
tuting their own "life policy" for religious training. 
They refuted the assertion that Chinese students could 
choose to attend other schools. One missionary believed 
Chinese students' "only escape from a life of drudgery is 
the education afforded by the Christian institution, and he 
is glad to accept its advantages on any terms." 77 
Missionaries unopposed to registration accepted the 
change to voluntary religious functions. They did not 
believe this compromised the Christian nature of their 
educational institutions. These educators maintained that 
living a Christian life and setting a good e~ample was the 
most effective way to influence Chinese students. Many 
hoped by registering the schools they could work for 
reforms and exert a greater influence on the national 
educational system. When the .alternative was closing the 
schools, these missionaries chose registration. 7~ 
Regis~ering with the northern government in Beijing or 
the KMT in Guangzhou also meant Chinese would assume the 
administrative positions of missionaries. In support of 
this, the editor of the Educational Review argued in 1925 
that the problems of Christian education were actually 
Chinese problems. The issue of Chinese control of mission 
schools "has suddenly come to its crisis." Because 
missionaries were foreigners, they must let Chinese 
Christians fight for religious and educational freedom. 79 
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Although Christian educators frequently said they had 
no objecti.ons to the transfer of authority, they did little 
to implement this before 1927.90 John Mott met with 
mission leaders in an emergency conference in January 1926 
at Shanghai. He suggested all Christian educators study 
carefully the issue of voluntary religion in the schools. 
The missionaries at the conference resolved: "The process 
of devolution of authority should be pushed forward as 
rapidly as possible and more rapidly than has hitherto been 
contemplated. "F.J:L 
The success of the KMT Northern Expedition in 1927 
stimulated a wave of candid responses in the missionary 
literature. E.H. Cressy observed that the missionaries had 
talked for decades about giving more responsibility to the 
Chinese. Yet "they have been waiting until they were good 
and ready before doing so." Now "the present revolution 
has snatched the war k out of their hands." r::iw~ Rawlinson, in 
the Chinese Recorder, evaluated the problem of "the inade-
quacy of Chinese Christian leadership in the field of 
religious education." He attributed this to "the fact that 
the missionaries have kept this type of work too much in 
their own hands." e;;;~ In surprise, the editor of the 
Educational Review exclaimed: "Chinese leadership has 
arrived. Suddenly. The time is unpropitious. No oppor-
tunity has been available for careful preparation. " 9 ~ .. 
The majority of Christian educators did not seriously 
consider registration until 1927. 9~ At that time, the 
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missionaries perceived the military and political power of 
the KMT would eventually necessitate their compliance. The 
missionary evacuation accomplished the transfer of author-
ity to the Chinese that the foreign Christians had previ-
ously promised. Although some schools closed, most 
remained in operation with Chinese serving on the faculties 
and boards of trustees. The editor of the China Christian 
Year Book reported in 1929 that there were few problems 
under the new conditions. He expressed concern, however, 
about one development in the Chinese-controlled schools. 
The Chinese hired the best teachers based on their scholas-
tic qualifications. This resulted in a majority of the 
faculty of Christian schools being non-Christians. 86 
In 1928 Herman C.E. Liu became President of Shanghai 
-·--....._ 
College. He admitted that Christian education had "broken 
down somewhat," but this was just a "passing.phase in the 
evolution of Christianity in China." People had criticized 
mission schools because of their poor quality, ritualism, 
and "self-centeredness." Liu acknowledged these problems 
yet believed Christian education was capable of finding 
solutions~ Because Chinese were assuming responsibilities 
previously held by missionaries, Liu was optimistic about 
the future of Christian schools. 87 
.· 
The secondary literature on Christian education in 
China is critical of some aspects of the missionaries' 
efforts. Latourette believes Chinese Christian graduates 
did not function well in local churches. Their superior 
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education was not a preparation for the realities of 
Chinese life in the 1920s. The emphasis on the use of 
English and Western subjects and the neglect of Chinese 
subjects reinforced the differences between Christian and 
non-Christian Chinese.ea 
Latourette maintains that foreign and Chinese Chris-
tians agreed on the principle of registration. Missionar-
ies did not strongly oppose the transf~r of authority to 
Chinese administrators. They also recognized the need for 
a more practical curriculum including courses on Chinese 
literature and history. The divisive issue was compulsory 
religion courses and religious exercises. Chinese Chris-
tians favored making these a voluntary part of Christian 
education and many resented this mandatory aspect of the 
schools. 139 
Alice Gregg believes Chinese Christians desired 
changes in the mission schools long before the May Thir~ 
tieth Incident. From 1909 until 1927, "missionaries were 
under pressure from Chinese Christians who were asking a 
share in the determining of educational content and 
policy .. "90 Yamamoto Tatsuro and Yamamoto Sumiko emphasize 
the effects of the May Thirtieth Incident on students in 
Christian schools. After that event, the students joined 
the anti-imperialism and educational rights.recovery 
movement. The Yamamotos conclude: "In the last phases of 
the anti-Christian movement, when it was dominated by 
nationalism, one finds Christians participating in it."'71· 
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In her authoritative monograph on the subject, Jessie 
Gregory Lutz agrees with the Yamamotos. She finds the 
charge that Christian students were unpatriotic or "dena-
tionalized" applicable only to the early 1920s. Many 
Christian gra.duates joine_d the nationalistic movement and 
the issue divided the Christian college campuses. Lutz 
criticizes Christi.an education for not addressing the 
desires of the Chinese earlier. She writes: "When nation-
alism began to demand greater emphasis on Chinese culture 
and greater use of Chin~se, the Christian colleges' 
response was slow .... Lutz conclude~ mission schools did not 
develop the leaders to change China into a liberal Chris-
tian democratic nation."i>e 
Edward Rhoads posits a dichotomy between the responses 
to Chinese nationalism of missionary educators and evange-
lists .. In his study of Lingnan University after the 
shootings in Guangzhou on 23 June 1925, Rhoads examines the 
reactions of the president and vice president of the 
university. Alexander Baxter, the vice president, was an 
evangelist who believed the primary role of Christian 
schools was to create Christians. Baxter did not under-
stand the anti-Christian movement and was alienated from 
the students. He "also misjudged the pervasiveness and the 
strength of the nationalistic appeal.""i>::!l 
James McClure Henry, president of the university, 
although an ordained Presbyterian, concentrated his efforts 
on education. Henry "was not hostile to nationalism; on 
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the contrary, he accepted its development as inevitable, 
and pe~haps even welcomed it as a hopeful sign of China's 
resurgence." Rhoads believes the contrast between Baxter 
and Henry was typical of broader conflict in the missionary 
community. Conservative evangelists and liberal missionary 
educators reacted in opposite ways to Chinese nationalism. 
He concludes that "the victory of the missionary educator 
and the liberal was hastened by the success of the Nation-
alist Revolution." Ironically, this "in turn paved the way 
for the immediate nationalization of the Christian colleges 
and ultimately for their secularization."''»<+ 
Indigenous Chinese Protestantism 
The missionaries who returned to their stations in 
1927 and 1928 confronted a new situation. The Nationalist 
government at Nanjing had established a military and polit-
ical hegemony over most of China. Both Chinese and 
foreigners realized Western nations would now be extremely 
reluctant to use military power to enforce extraterritori-
ality. The KMT Central Education Commission was trying to 
"nationalize" Christian schools by forcing them to register 
under its regulations. Chinese Christians had replaced 
missionaries in the administration of schools and churches. 
Some missionaries wondered if the Chinese would welcome 
their return. They also speculated about the possibilities 
of continuing in their previous positions of leadership. 
The majority of missionaries believed there was still 
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a need for them in China. When many of the home mission 
boards hesitated to return their forces to full strength, 
one missi.onary advocated the number of workers be in-
creased. He pointed out that "after more than one hundred 
years of Protestant missionary work, we can only claim one 
worshiper in four hundred." 9 !5 Another foreign Christian 
allayed the fears of his colleagues by appealing to divine 
authority. God determined who went to China, not mission 
boards or Chinese churches. 96 
As foreigners returned to the interior, they reported 
that Chinese Christians had managed to survive the absence 
of the missionaries. F.H. Hawkins found "the Chinese 
Church, on the whole, carried on Christian work with much 
heroism and success." Th~ fact that in some areas there 
was "a tendency for politics to t·ake too prominent a place 
in Church life and teaching" disturbed Hawkins. Vet he 
believed that "never was there a greater opportunity before 
the Church to win China for Christ."'"7 
Chinese Christian leaders reassured the missionaries 
they still wanted them in China. Li Fu Hsiang, however, 
saw the missionary role as having changed. Hsiang told 
fo~eign Christians their new duties would include visiting 
and inspiring churches, contributing to religious educa-
tion, and social service. Hsiang did not include holding 
administrative offices among the nei,-1 missionary func-
tions. 91-::i 
Djang Fang credited the evacuation with being "one of 
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the causes of the starting of new movements in the Chinese 
Church." Chinese Christian leaders had gained a new 
initiative ·and some missionaries had adapted to this. Fang 
observed that others "can hardly be blamed if, in view of 
their previous training, social heritage, individual 
personality and administrative necessities," they do not 
accept the changed conditions.•• 
Fang's attitude towards missionaries who disliked 
their displacement by Chinese was magnanimous. "For decades 
foreign Christians professed a policy of developing Chinese 
leaders for the churches in China. This was a primary goal 
in establishing indigenous Christianity. Independent 
churches with dynamic Chinese Christian leaders were ~o be 
the method of salvation for the nation. When Chinese 
assumed positions of authority during the evacuation in 
1927, this fulfilled many aspects of the policy of 
devolution. 
The missionary literature of the 1920s frequently 
referred to the urgent need to develop competent Chinese 
leadership. John Stuart Burgess, secretary for the Beijing 
YMCA, outlined a "Program for the Present Crisis in China" 
in 1920. Burgess included social reconstruction through 
Christian study of political and social conditions in 
China. Christians should offer a plan for moral and so~ial 
reform including "disinterested" pu,blic service. Burgess 
believed the most important task was training Chinese 
Christian leaders. They should be theologically sound and 
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willing to work for the "social reconstruction of the 
nation." 10 •::> 
Frida Nilsen, a missionary for the Norwegian Lutheran 
Church of America, recognized that· "the Chinese· were still 
in the learning stage and they accepted missionary leader-
ship as perfectly natural" during this period. Nilsen 
added: "But we were training the Chinese for leadership in 
the church. 11 1r.)1 According to A.L. Warnshuis, Chinese 
leadership meant Chinese ministers. More Chinese ministers 
would help refute the typical Chinese view that Christi-
anity was a foreign religion. Warnshuis suggested mission-
aries surrender the authority to appoint church workers to 
the Chinese churches.10~ 
In 1922 Frank Rawlinson maintained the Chinese 
churches still needed the guidance of missionaries. He 
observed that the "Church is relatively weak, still 
incoherent and not yet fully conscious of its responsi-
bilities.111•~>3 After anti-Christianity, anti-foreignism, 
and nationalism increased in 1925, Rawlinson divided 
missionary opinion on devolution into two groups. Many 
missionaries said only that they would give more authority 
to Chinese Christians sometime in the future under certain 
unspecified conditions. Others, including Rawlinson, 
predicted: "When Chinese Christian _leadership is ready it 
will take the helm."H)"+ 
Some missionaries contended that the issue of devolu-
tion was a Chinese problem. They argued that Chinese 
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Christians were reluctant to accept' responsibility. 
William Overholt said the majority of missionaries favored 
devolution but before 1927 the Chinese did not cooperate 
with them. Overholt believed the evacuation forced Chinese 
to assume positions of leadership against their wishes. 10~ 
Other foreign Christian~ opposed the idea of turning 
administrative authority over to their followers. Amy 
Foster disliked much of what she read in the Chinese 
Recorder. In a letter to the editor, she wrote: "That 
youths of any race should be taught to aspire to leadership 
is to my mind a dangerous doctrine." Because they are 
trained or are well qualified does not mean Chinese "are to 
lead the foreigners." Foster advised Chinese Christians to 
be content to be followers. Rowland Hogben agreed with 
Foster and added it was not the duty of missionaries to 
train Chinese to be secular or religious leaders. 10• 
Resistance to devolution by some missionaries contin-
ued throughout the 1920s. Rawlinson admitted in 1925 that 
missionaries "will doubtless be pained and perplexed" that 
they "may have to •take a back seat' in the councils and 
work of the Chinese Church." 1 '::>7 In 1927 T.Z. Koo main-
tained that a small group of missionaries were doubtful the 
churches could survive without their guidance and therefore 
"have kept a restraining hand on the growing consciousness 
of the indigenous church. 11106 George R. Grose assessed 
"The Present Missionary Morale" in 1927 by questioning a 
"score" of men in seven different denominations. He found 
I 
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that "the mission as a foreign organization had been too 
slow in becoming an integral part of the Chinese Christian 
Church." Grose concluded: "It is not easy for a benevolent 
paternal ism to pass into a true fraternal ism." J.o9 
Yet many missionaries favored devolution and worked to 
develop independent churches with capable Chinese leaders. 
Frank Rawlinson believed the period following World War I 
was the time to implement this policy. In 1919 he wrote: 
"Here is an opening for the play of Chinese initiative. We 
look for the Chinese leadership to step forward.'1110 Isaac 
Mason rejected the idea that most missionaries opposed 
independent Chinese churches. He admitted, however, that 
many missionaries in the past had "behaved badly on this 
quest ion. 11 l. l. l. 
Erwin Hertz worked as an English teacher in Fenzhou 
from 1924 to 1927. He thought indigenous Christianity 
"seemed to be the spirit of the mission station." This 
meant "that we were to turn over to the Chinese much of the 
work and as soon as possible.":u.e In 1925 H.T. Hodgkin 
advocated countering the anti-Christian movement by giving 
more power to Chinese leadership. Hodgkin warned that "at 
our peril will the missionary organizations hold to the 
rudder when they should hand it over to those well quali-
fied to take i t . 11 1 1;;:, 
After the conference with John Mott in 1926 at Shang-
hai, missionary leaders advised their colleagues to adopt 
new attitudes. To accommodate the demands of Chinese 
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Christians, missionaries should be willing to accept 
functions the Chinese churches assigned to them. They 
should agree to serve under Chinese control. Missionaries 
should also "minimize official status and emphasize 
personal service. 11 :1. :L"-• 
Missionary organizations achieved various degrees of 
devolution during the 1920s. Maud Russell served with the 
vwc~ from 1917 to 1943. She related that American volun-
teers were completely under the control of the VWCA's 
National Board in China. Although a foreigner served as 
General Secretary until 1926, a majority of the board 
members were Chinese. The V's recruiters in the United 
States told Russell before she went to China that "all of 
the decisions about you will be made by the Chinese 
National Board." She believed this "was on a right basis 
right from the beginning." 11 "5 
The missionaries of the ABCFM North China Mission were 
leaders in advocating the development of Chinese Christian 
leadership. In June 1914, they voted to establish the 
North China Council. This council involved missionaries 
and Chinese as partners in the administration of affiliated 
Congregational churches in that area. The council called 
this affiliation of churches the North China Gong Li Hui. 
Roland Cross, who served as American secretary for the Gong 
Li Hui, recognized "many leaders in other missions viewed 
with skepticism, even apprehension, this new plan" of 
including Chinese in administration. 116 
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Cross reported several instances of devolution in the 
China Mission Year Book, 1925. These included Chinese 
serving on the boards of control for the YMCA and YWCA 
since 1914 and the establishment of the North China Gong Li 
Hui. The Methodist Episcopal Church in 1920 made joint 
appointments of missionaries and Chinese to the district 
superintendent position. In 1922 the Presbyterian Church, 
North, ~dopted a policy of creating joint Chinese-American 
associations to administer missionary work. When members 
of the Beijing Missionary Association vdted on the issue of 
missionaries becoming members of local Chinese churches in 
November 1923, 90 percent approved.ii 7 
.ln researching the issue of devolution, Cross studied 
the minutes of Beijing missionary society meetings from 
1905 to 1925. He found that there had been a "frequent 
sensing" of the need to give more responsibility to the 
Chinese. Yet, "very often there has not been a willingness 
to pay the price of thoroughgoing change." Cross argued 
that even with the changes already made, "control, in many 
cases, is still kept in the hands of the missionary." He 
I 
believed foreign Christians accomplished this by control-
ling the salaries of the Chinese serving on joint commit-
tees. Another technique was the use of "specials" or 
"specifics." These gifts of money from the United States 
designated only for their use gave missionaries additional 
"power of the purse. 111 :u:t 
The issues of money and property complicated the 
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policy of devolution. Because mission boards in the United 
States raised the funds that supported Christianity in 
China, the officers of those organizations controlled the 
budgets of the missionaries. Christian schools and Chinese 
churches depended upon financial aid from the West for 
their very existence. They received this money through the 
missionaries. It was much easier for the missionaries to 
approve giving Chinese Christians more leadership than to 
relinquish control of the budget. 
As the missionaries discussed devolution of adminis-
tration in the 1920s, they also debated the question of 
financial control. Some missionaries adamantly opposed 
giving the Chinese responsibility for money or property. 
One foreign Christian believed this was the largest problem 
in the "indigenization" of Christianity. He observed that 
"God made the Occidental to be a Christian. But it takes 
God and the Occidental to make an Oriental Christian.":Ll"r 
James Maxon Yard, General Secretary of the Executive Board 
of Methodist Missions, admitted: "There is sometimes 
difficulty in the relationship with the home boards in the 
matter of property and funds." l.<i?.o 
In discussing "How to Devolve the Work of the Church," 
Donald Fay separated missionary opinion on this problem 
into three categories. A few wanted to turn all aspects of 
the work over to the Chinese immediately. The majority 
adhered to the traditional stance of promising transfer 
sometime in an undefined future. They thought "that 
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Christian work should be handed over to the Chinese as soon 
as the Chinese are ready for it." The third group was 
conservative and opposed devolution. Fay proposed that 
church property transfer as each Chinese congregation 
became able to meet one-third of its budget. He predicted 
the question of church property "will be a great problem 
for any of us to handle. " 1 1E~:1. 
Most mission societies included financial responsibil-
ity as part of their plans for devolution after 1925. The 
Northern Baptist Mission in East China transferred an 
entire mission, including evangelical work, middle school, 
and hospital to the Chinese. The results of this were not 
satisfactory and gave "abundant evidence that this mission 
has not yet solved its problem. 111 <=1:!! 
In 1927 several missions joined the Northern Baptists 
in giving more control to Chinese Christians. The Council 
of the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society voted 
approval of the principle of property transfer but took no 
other action. The Council of the North China Gong Li Hui 
put both foreign financial aid and personnel under Chinese 
administration. The ABCFM, the home board of this mission, 
leased its property to the Chinese and planned to make a 
permanent transfer. The· Methodist Episcopal mission gave 
control of church property to a Chinese financial committee 
and took preliminary steps towards a title change. The 
missions of the Presbyterian Church, North, Presbyterian 
Church, South, and Methodist Episcopal Church, South were 
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initiating plans for devolution that included some dispen-
sation of property. These actions by missionary leaders in 
China had the approval of the mission boards in the United 
States. 1-~.?.~ 
There were difficult problems related to the issue of 
financial devolution. The majority of Chinese Christians 
were very poor and incapable of financing the schools and 
churches the missionaries had established. Chinese 
churches could not support their own ministers. If 
property transferred to Chinese Christians, they could not 
afford to pay taxes and other fees.is4 
Frank Rawlinson suggested a "new emphasis in economic 
cooperation" as a solution for some of these problems. In 
1928 he advocated giving Chinese Christians total admini-
strative responsibility while maintaining "dua·1 support." 
Many churches engaged in "economic self-help" but could not 
accomplish "economic self-reliance .. " Rawlinson predicted 
"this latter will not be possible for many churches and 
institutions for a long time" and the West should continue 
its financial aid.i~e One missionary expressed an opposite 
opinion: The Chinese "are in the dangerous position of 
being able to fix their own salaries and emoluments. 
is an impossible situation in any lanc~. 111 -=c. 
This 
Because the concept of indigenous Christianity 
included independent· theology as well as independent 
churches, missionaries expected undefined alterations to 
occur in the religion of Chinese Christians. Chinese 
Christian leaders also believed in and advocated the 
development of a unique Chinese Protestantism as part of 
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the "indigenization" of Christianity. There was division 
in missionary opinion on what forms Chinese Protestantism 
would assume. 
Some missionaries believed the social aspects of 
Christianity were important in developing an indigenous 
Chinese religion. Rawlinson asserted that "Christian 
idealism" and "Chinese idealism" were similar. He suggest-
ed that missionaries recognize that Chinese think in terms 
of the salvation of society, not personal salvation. He 
advocated foreign Christians and Chinese Christians working 
together to create a society worthy of salvation. 1 ~7 
Roland Cross believed the social gospel was attractive to 
the Chinese because it "was not too much other-worldly but 
was activist in· this world. 111 ee1 
Paul Hayes urged missionaries to instruct Chinese 
ministers and church members to identify themselves with 
th• major interests of their communities. He attributed 
some of the criticism of Christianity to the fact that "too 
often the church is a thing apart, a foreign guild." The 
most important need was "a thoroughly. tested form of public 
ritual for the reverence of ancestors, thus identifying the 
church with the better values in the prevalent worship of 
ancestors." l.&. 9 
Chinese Christian leaders wanted to develop a religion 
in China that would be "Chinese," but had no specific goals 
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other than separation from the West. An all-Chinese 
committee addressed this issue when it met in conjunction 
with a national Christian convention in 1922. The members 
resolved that the "Chinese Church should not be alien to 
the racial inheritance and spiritual experience of our 
people." They especially opposed "slavish imitation" and 
advocated the establishment of churches that take "cogni-
zance of the spiritual inheritance of the Chinese race." 
The committee asked missionaries to give "unfettered 
freedom to the Chinese Christians in these experiments. 11180 
Other Chinese objected to the development of denomina-
tionalism in China. Over 130 Protestant denominations had 
missionaries in China at this time. 131 For the tradition-
ally eclectic Chinese, this was confusing. C.Y. Cheng 
criticized this aspect of Christianity, writing: "China has 
shown little interest in these imported divisions. 111 ;;;ii.= 
David Z.T. Yui advised missionarie~ that the Chinese wanted 
a united Christianity and needed the help of Western 
Christians in an ecumenical movement. 133 
Missionaries observed that they created churches in 
China that were more "foreign" than indigenous. Often the 
result was neither Chinese nor Western. One missionary 
described the singing of hymns at Sunday worship as "a 
doggerel which can scarcely be called Chinese of any 
style."u34 Paul Hayes admitted that the Methodists "didn't 
do anything in the matter of ritual, except the translation 
of the rituals we already had." Their "churches stood up 
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like sore thumbs" because they were Western style. 1 "3!!5 
There was opposition to changing Christianity to meet 
the d~mands of Chinese Christians. J.G.G. Bompas main-
tained that "what China needs to-day is to be westernized." 
Christianity, with its Western connotations, would assist 
in this. There was no need to alter Christianity because 
"much that is distinctively Chinese is going to be lost." 
Bompas explained "the real danger is that we try to estab-
1 i sh an eastern type of Christianity. 11 J.:=io 
John DeKorne, a missionary, taught at Calvin College 
and Theological Seminary after he served in China in the 
early 1920s. He cautioned the aspiring ministers that 
"China has changed every religion that has come to her." 
DeKorne believed it was acceptable to allow the Chinese to 
develop a "de-Westernized" version of Christianity unless 
"it would humanize or Sinicize pure Christianity." This 
would be "something against which we must testify." :i.;:~ 7 
Edwin Marx agreed the Chinese had a right to create their 
own Christianity just as Greeks, Catholics, Protestants, 
Anglicans, or Baptists had. Yet he pleaded: "After reliev-
ing Jesus of his Western regalia, spare Him the ordeal of 
being tricked out in mandarin garments. 111 ae 
The secondary literature on the issues of devolution 
is generally critical of the missionaries' efforts. 
Latourette, a China missionary, is more appreciative of the 
problems involved and his colleagues' attempts to overcome 
them. He maintains the majority of missionaries believed 
administration would eventually transfer to the Chinese. 
Yet "numbers of them were not quite as insistent as the 
'natives' that the transfer be made quickly." In the 
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1920s, "especially after 1925, events moved mor.e rapidly 
than some of the missionaries were prepared to.approve. 11 :1.:::i~,. 
Latourette credits "the nationalistic temper of the 
Chinese" with accelerating devolution. When the mission-
aries relinquished their control, they did not confront 
major problems in finding replacements. The largest 
obstacle was creating an ordained ministry, "for nothing in 
the Chinese background quite corresponded to the Christian 
pastor." Latourette believes "the rapid transfer of 
authority to the Chinese gave to some of the missionaries a 
feeling of insecurity." He notes that as late as 1935 
missionaries still held many administrative positions. "To 
those who cherished the vision of what should be, progress 
towards the goal at times seemed discouragingly slow. 11 :1.•+o 
Paul Varg finds that missionaries exerted their 
influence in different ways after giving "official" author-
ity to the Chinese. Missionaries "educated" the Chinese on 
making the right decisions by sitting on joint committees 
or serving as advisors. Because they had years of admini-
strative experience and an intense interest in the work, 
missionaries often held an advantage over the Chinese in 
any partnership arrangement. Varg believes the Chinese 
concentrated on the issue of foreign control and deferred 
to the missionaries on other issues.:1. 4 :1. 
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Janet Heininger, in her study of American Board 
missionaries, maintains they failed to achieve the goal of 
self-supporting Chinese churches. The low economic status 
of the missionaries' converts was the principal reason for 
this. The American Board's North China Mission led most 
missionary societies in transferring church administration 
to Chinese. The missionaries, however, used "their 
position as •holders of t~e money-bag'" to exert a greater 
influence than they were entitled to in the new organiza-
tional structure. 14e 
Stephen Neill is more critical of the missionaries 
than the other authors. He argues that there was a 
tendency for missionaries to maintain their positions of 
authority for too long. This occurred because "the belief 
-, 
in the innate superiority of the white man" created an 
inertia that required decades to escape. 14~ 
Three missionaries who participated in the China Oral 
History Project in the 1970s also criticized the progress 
of devolution in the 1920s. Clemens Granskou recalled the 
Lutheran mission emphasized the training of Chinese 
Christian leaders, "but we were slow in turning over 
leadership, a little bit slow." Granskou explained that 
one of the reasons was paternalism. "We were too slow in 
.• 
recognizing the Chinese needed to take over and found their 
own church. We were too reluctant to accept that." He 
regretted that the Chinese equated Christianity with 
Western culture. Preventing this was difficult because 
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"the new curriculum, the hymns, the liturgy, and even the 
architecture all reflected western customs." This was 
unfortunate because "our major job then was to Christian-
ize, not westernize, Chinese civilization." 144 
Paul Hayes believed the missionaries expected Chinese 
Christians "to develop more rapidly than was possible in 
matters of self-support, self-government, self-promotion." 
The failure of' the missionaries to consider the Chinese 
point of view contributed to this. "All we did, not 
intentionally but because we didn't seem to know any other 
way of doing it, was too foreign for easy acceptance on the 
part of our Chinese people." 141.'!'i 
The lesson Herman Bly learned from his China experi-
enc:~ "was that we should appreciate more the indigenous 
culture and way of life of the Chinese." Bly argued that 
"Christianity should have been divorced from the cultural 
background of the nations from which it had come." 
Although the missionaries went to Sdve the Chinese, they 
"didn't go there to make Americans out of them or to make 
them appreciate American culture." Bly concluded: "Mis-
sionaries now know and believe that some things could have 
been done in a more indigenous way." :L 4 ""-' 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: MISSIONARIES AND CHINESE 
NATIONALISM DURING THE CRITICAL 
DECADE, 1919-1928 
As the third decade of the twentieth century began, 
American missionaries believed their efforts to save China 
would finally achieve the results they desired. China was 
"awake" after centuries of dynastic inertia. New intellec-
tual trends combined with a spirit of nationalism to 
produce a feeling of optimism and progress. Missionaries 
perceived this as their opportunity to effect substantial 
changes in the social and religious life of the nation. 
China was on the verge of entering the modern world and, 
with God's help, it would become a "Christian" democracy. 
Conversely, the decade ended with the evacuation of 
thousands of missionaries from the interior, many leaving 
China forever. Anti-foreignism, anti-Christianity, and 
"radical" nationalism altered the position of the mission-
' aries in China. Chinese Christians engaged in the move-
.• 
ments against the West and demanded that the missionaries 
fulfill their commitments to devolution. This development 
compounded the problems the missionaries confronted in this 
crucial period. The responses of foreign Christians to the 
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issues of Chinese nationalism that affected their missions 
determined their fate. The failure of the missionaries to 
respond appropriately to the demands of their followers led 
to the loss of any opportunity for Christianity this period 
presented. 
The Critical Decade: Missionaries and 
"Radical" Chinese Nationalism 
Missionaries predicted the years following World War I 
would be a turning point in their campaign to save China. 
The editor of the China Mission Year Book told his readers 
in 1919 that "the next five to ten years are to be supreme-
ly critical years for the Church in China, as well as years 
of unbounded opportunity." This statement was represent-
ative of the general sentiment of most foreign Christians. 1 
The increase in nationalism, intellectual change, and 
political and social awareness of Chinese youth would give 
Christianity its gre~test occasion to effect the unsaved 
masses of China. Milton Stauffer, editor of the Christian 
Occupation of China, hoped the development of indigenous 
Christianity would relieve the churches of the ''incubus of 
being regarded as a •foreign religion.'"I!~ 
The anti-Christian campaigns and attacks on missionary 
.. 
institutions after 1924 reinforced the belief that this was 
the decisive period for Christianity in China. The 
"unbounded opportunity," however, was now obscure. Mis-
sionaries believed the movement against Christian education 
174 
was a crucial threat to their endeavor.~ In 1927 they con-
fronted falling income from the home churches, reductions 
in staff, inadequate salaries, contention with other 
foreigners, and increasing criticism from their converts. 
The unification of the nation and the evacu~tion of the 
missionaries produced "a missionary revolution." D. 
Willard Lyon announced: "It is plainly obvious that the 
missionary cannot return to a position similar to the one 
he has previously occupied."'°'" 
Chinese Christians also believed the 1920s were a 
fateful juncture in the history of Christianity in their 
nation. David Z.T. Yui speculated that the anti-Christian 
and anti-forei.gn "phases of our present revolutionary 
movement" might end the missionary enterprise. The 
hostility of some Chinese "seemed to indicate the dire 
possibility that all Christian work of the past century in 
China may be uprooted and that there may be no future for 
it at all."1!5 In 1928 Frank Ra~'l/linson admitted that "a 
roll-call of church members in China would in many places 
show a decrease." The Chinese church "has also lost 
decidedly in evangelistic aggressiveness owing to its 
disturbed state of mind." Rawlinson concluded that 1927 
was a "baptism of fire."·"" 
.• 
The "disturbed state of mind" in the Chinese churches 
was the result of the missionary evacuation. This satis-
fied the demands of Chinese Christians for more administra-
tive independence. Afterwards Chinese Christians and 
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mission~ries confronted the issues of their new relation-
ship. Missionaries wanted to return to their former 
positions of prestige and leadership. Chinese Christians 
would not relinquish the fulfillment of their nationalis~ic 
aspirations. Rawlinson's "baptism of fire" was actually a 
political conflict within the Christiah community. 
sionaries had tried to avoid this and failed. 
Mis-
The reactions of Chinese Christians and missionaries 
to the issues of nationalism diverged after the May 
Thirtieth Incident in 1925. Chinese Christians felt 
obligated to defend Chinese nationalism. P. W. Kuo, in 
explaining the "Present Situation" i.n 1926, maintained that 
Chinese nationalism was not entirely destructive, anti-
foreign, or "bolshevistic." The movement was patriotic and 
worked for social, economic, and political reforms. 7 P.C. 
Hsu argued in the 1929 China Christian Year Book that a 
nationalist could be a good Christian. It was foreign 
control of Christianity in China that caused conflict. 8 
Such arguments served to defend Chinese Christians 
against the attacks of anti-Christians who questioned their 
patriotism. They also were meant to allay the fears of 
missionaries who looked with disapproval on the increasing 
participation of Chinese Christians in the nationalist 
movement. Dissension intensified when Chinese Christians 
began to criticize the missionaries. 
Chinese Christians questioned missionary opposition to 
their political involvement. Many believed they had a 
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"responsibility to discharge in promoting right ideals in 
political as in other realms of life." 9 It li'Jas in the best 
interests of the churches to influence politics. Gideon 
Chen, a secretary for the National Christian Council, 
wrote: "The Church will be doomed if it fails to turn out 
trustworthy personalities in political careers.":i.<:) 
Missionaries were aware of their followers' desires to 
help shape China's political destiny. H.T. Hodgkin rec-
ognized that Chinese Christians believed "the Church is the 
one body that can speak out on great political matters, and 
that she wi 11 betray her trust if she keeps s i 1 ence. ":L :L 
Yet other missionaries chose to maintain a more traditional 
attitude towards the Chinese. One missionary commented 
from Guangzhou that "Chinese Christians, like other Chinese 
citizens, do riot grea~ly care what party is in power so 
long as their ordinary routine is undisturbed." 1 '-'.! Many 
missionaries believed politics and Christianity did not 
mix. One missionary advised Rawlinson to leave politics 
out of the Chinese Recorder ''and let the politicians air 
their views in a periodical of their own. 111 :::1 
In spite of this advice, Rawlinson attempted to 
explain the attitudes of Chinese Christians on politics. 
He wrote that "full often are we told that Christians 
should leave politics alone." Chinese Christians, however, 
were sensitive to political issues because of the Confucian 
tradition. China's great thinkers historically tried to 
apply ethics to political life. Following this example, 
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now "an increasing number of [Chinese] Christians desire to 
make Christ's principles live in their political re-
lations. 111 '+ 
Contrary to Rawlinson's explanation, it was the 
missionaries who set the example for political involvement. 
The majority of missionaries were involved in the politics 
of treaty revision after the May Thirtieth Incident. They 
professed their support for devolution which was inherently 
a political issue. Yet missionaries traditionally com-
manded their followers to abstain from "partisan politics." 
When politics threatened to disrupt the normal missionary-
convert relationship, the concerns of the missionaries 
increased. 
After 1925 Chinese Christians emphasized their desires 
to establish independent churches. Writing in 1926, T.C. 
Bau observed that although Protestantism had "more than one 
hundred years of history there has as yet existed no real 
Chinese Church." Christian songs, forms of worship, and 
even the church buildings were foreign. Bau maintained "in 
polity and worship Christianity has been a foreign reli-
gion, and the Church a foreign institution." He anno"unced 
that Chinese churches were forming a national movement for 
independence in response to the May Foµrth Movement, anti-
Christianity, and "the overwhelming nationalistic 
sp i r it . ":t \'!~ 
Hsu Pao Ch'ien, a secretary for the YMCA, made similar 
remarks as early as 1920. Hsu believed the Renaissance o.r 
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May Fourth Movement "had caused the Christians in China to 
pause and think." He urged Christians to direct the 
critical spirit of this movement and lead it in recon-
structing Chinese s6ciety. Hsu then offered his own 
criticisms of Chinese Christianity including the mission-
aries, Chinese ministers, lay leaders, and Chinese church 
members. i .:. 
Hsu and other Chinese Christians criticized missionar-
ies for "a certain amount of autocracy." Missionaries 
failed to train and incorporate Chinese Christians into 
church administration. Hsu emphasized this issue stating: 
"With the new awakening1 ot; the part of Chinese Christians 
for self-government and independence, the mission policy in 
China is confronted with a very delicate problem. 111 ·;T 
Chinese Christians realized missionaries opposed some 
aspects of their increasing desire for independence. They 
believed that many missionaries "view the rise of the 
Chinese to positions of leadership as the result of a 
spirit of nationalism and anti-foreignism as a sign of 
insubordination and usurpation. 1• 1 e David Z.T. Yui noticed 
that after the demands of both non-Christian and Christian 
Chinese increased in 1925 "many missionaries and mission 
administrators showed great anxiety." Following the events 
of 1926 and 1927, missionaries were "still anxious lest the 
institutions, organizations, [and] property may be occu-
pied, confiscated or destroyed." Yui claimed Chinese 
Christians were "enthusiastic, patriotic, and determined" 
to obtain the goal of indigenous Christianity. 1 ~ 
In October 1927, Rawlinson divided missionary atti-
tudes towards the "Nationalistic Revolution" into three 
groups. Some saw "little of value or promise in it." 
Others regretted the violence and destruction but were 
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optimistic about the outcome. A third group supported the 
revolution initially but had changed their minds and now 
opposed it . 1=·:~ In listing the "Effects of 1927 on the Work 
of Missionaries," L.H. Roots concluded that "personnel, 
property, institutions and morale have suffered, in many 
cases most pitifully. 11 1:! 1 
The editor of the 1929 edition of the China Christian 
Year Book admitted that Christianity 11 vie1rJed as a ~vhole had 
lost somewhat of its former momentum." He recognized "the 
Revolution has brought Christianity into a whirlpool, 
mentally, economically and spiritually."1"!2 In the same 
edition, missionaries filed reports from different areas of 
China on the "Effects of Five Years Upon the Chinese 
Church." Edwin Marx reported from east-central China that 
the issues had remained the same with some progress in 
"indigenization. 11 But the capability of both missionaries 
and Chinese to do evangelical work was only 50 percent that 
of five years earlier.~~ 
.J.S. Kunkle characterized the period as a "time of 
defense, not of advance" in south China. There were no new 
programs, new church buildings, or new members to report. 
George D. Wilder stated that "Gospel preaching in street 
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chapels has failed to win a hearing for decades" in north 
China. Both missionaries and Chinese had given up on this 
type of evangelism.e4 
Reverend Djang Fang of Nanjing Theological Seminary 
viewed the period after the 1927 KMT unification as a trial 
period for Christianity. He realistically thought the 
KMT's new toleration of religion was only "an expedient in 
international relations." To obtain religiou'.5 freedom, 
Fang urged "Christians at large to fight for it." Chris-
tianity "must submit to an examination to determine whethei-
it has a survival value or not." Becal,lSe of "the progress 
of science and desire for comfort, it is necessary to 
determine whether the human being is or is not in need of 
any such thing as religion."!!!!~'> 
C.Y. Cheng also believed Christianity confronted a new 
situation in China because of nationalism. He perceived a 
"spirit of criticism" in Chinese youth and noticed "even 
amongst Christian Chinese there is a general desire to 
reexamine the fundamentals of the Christian faith." Cheng 
advised missionaries and Christian leaders to "take note of 
the signs of the time and to make the adjustments necessary 
to meet the present challenge."e""' 
In retrospect, E.H. Cressy observed that "it was 
axiomatic that the National Movement should put great 
emphasis upon things Chinese." He concluded that "it was a 
natural corollary that it should in certain respects be 
anti-foreign."ai7 Many missionaries never reached the 
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understanding of Chinese nationalism that Cressy's words 
revealed. In 1954 John Leighton Stuart, an avowed anti-
Communist, predicted an early end to Mao Zedong's regime. 
The Chinese, Stuart affirmed, are "a people who are 
fundamentally democratic in their social behavior and their 
political aspirations." They could not remain Communists 
for 1 ong .1:.:1:1 
Between 1919 and 1928, there was a change in the 
responses of American missionaries to Chinese nationalism. 
Foreign Christian workers approved of Chinese nationalism 
as long as it was not a threat to their institutions. They 
supported and tried to direct "May Fourth nationalism" in 
the reconstruction of Chinese society. Chinese nationalism 
became more "radical" after the May Thirtieth Incident and 
many issues of the movement directly affected the vested 
interests of the missionaries. Although they advocated 
revision of the "unequal" treaties, missionaries could not 
appease all the demands of radical Chinese nationalism. To 
do this would mean the end of the missionary enterprise in 
China. Because both Christian and non-Christian Chinese 
decided the restoration of their nation's sovereignty was 
the vital task for their generation, they refused to 
tolerate foreign domination of any type, including that of 
.• 
Christian missionaries. 
The missionaries avoided a complete break with their 
followers by renewing their traditional commitments to 
devolution. Yet many missionaries resented their displace-
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ment by Chinese Christians during the 1927 evacuation. 
They, in fact, did not believe in or support the professed 
goal of devolution. The creation of self-governing, self-
supporting, and self-propagating Chinese churches remained 
unaccomplished. Missionaries withdrew their active support 
of the nationalist movement and tried to maintain as much 
of the status quo as possible. They were successful in 
preserving much of the missionary enterprise in China with 
few alterations for another twenty-five years. 
The conservative response of American missionaries to 
radical Chinese nationalism was unfortunate. The mission-
aries could only accommodate evolutionary change; China was 
in the midst of a revolution. Young Chinese intellectuals 
concluded that Christia!1ity would not be instrumental in 
making the radical transformation they desired in Chinese 
society. The missionaries' failure to willingly surrender 
control of Christian institutions in China perpetuated the 
perception that Christianity was an aspect of Western 
"imperialism." This alienated many of their followers. In 
a period when patriotism became synonymous with anti-
foreignism, the political identification of religious 
beliefs intensified. This extinguished any opportunity for 
Christianity in China. The majority of Chinese concluded 




Historians often refer to the years between the 
establishment of the KMT government in 1928 and the 
Japanese attack in 1937 as the "Nanjing decade."c=.9 Chiang 
Kai-shek and the Nationalist party strengthened their 
control over China and initiated changes in the social and 
economic life of the country during this period. Chiang 
sponsored the "New Life Movement" in 1934 as an attempt to 
revive traditional Chinese values and implement health and 
sanitary reforms. He sought the assistance of missionaries 
in this effort and reassured Western nations, especially 
the United States, that the Chinese needed and welcomed 
their assistance. Despite this rapprochement, the plight 
of Christianity in China did not improve. 
Chiang wanted to incorporate American missionaries and 
Chinese Christians into the New Life Movement in order to 
bolster his regime. The KMT accomplished this by convinc-
ing some missionaries to join the "model" rural reconstruc-
tion proje_cts that were a part of the New Life Movement. 
The New Life Movement achieved little success in rural or 
urban China. Many Chinese intellectuals quickly became 
discouraged with the conservative KMT government. Chiang 
hoped to counter this with the support of the C~ristian 
community. He also wanted to influence students in 
Christian colleges and he needed the vital connection with 
the United States the missionaries provided.~0 Ironically, 
this reversal of KMT policy towards the missionaries did 
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not benefit the position of Christianity in China. Because 
Christianity became identified with Chiang's regime, the 
missionaries received the same rejection as the KMT and the 
New Life Movement in the 1930s. 
Some missionaries remained skeptical of Chiang and the 
KMT in the Nanjing decade. Clemens Granskou believed "he 
was more interested in his power than in his reform of the 
country." Granskou faulted Chiang for not implementing 
land reform. Land tenure was a critical problem in rural 
China where millions of peasants suffered through years of 
famine, high taxes, and usuary. Granskou concluded: Chiang 
"was getting most of his support from the landowners, 
therefore, he was slow to really reinforce the agrarian 
revolution which I thought was a necessity.";:n 
The neglect of rural China was also a missionary 
problem. Missionaries in the twentieth century tended to 
concentrate their efforts in cities and large towns. Most 
of the one million villages of China remained beyond the 
scope of mission work during the 1920s. Missionaries were 
involved in flood and famine relief but did not develop the 
extensive programs necessary to correct many rural prob-
lems. When foreign Christian workers became involved in 
rural reconstruction through the New Life Movement, their 
attempts were minimal and came too late to influence the 
direction of Christianity. 
Missionaries were not unaware of the problems of the 
rural Chinese. Between 1919 and 1928 they frequently 
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called attention to this area of neglected opportunity and 
made proposals to implement rural reconstruction programs. 
The regional delegates of the China Christian Educational 
Association addressed the issue in 1919. They petitioned 
the Executive Committee of that organization to formulate 
an "all China" plan to introduce agricultural education in 
mission schools. It was not until 1923 that the CCEA 
established an agricultural committee to develop agricul-
tural education.~~ In 1924 the National Christian Council 
recognized that "the creation of an indigenous church is 
clearly dependent in large measure upon the development of 
the rura 1 church. u::::;;::i The Advisory Counc i 1 of the CCEA 
recommended in the same year that middle schools serving 
rural areas'"should introduce agriculture in order to give 
their students a sympathetic rural outlook for their future 
The findings of the 1922 survey, Christian Occupation 
of China, reinforced the admonitions to exert more effort 
in rural reconstruction. The statistics in the survey 
revealed the extent of the missionaries' neglect of rural 
China .. Only 106 of China's 1,704 xian <counties) remained 
"unclaimed" by any Protestant missionary organization. 
Yet 45 percent of all "claimed" area was beyond eleven 
miles from any evangelistic center.~~ The survey found 
that 66 percent of all missionaries and 34 percent of 
Chinese Christian workers lived in cities with a population 
of 50,000 or greater. This concentration occurred between 
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1905 and 1915, the same time the number of missionaries 
substantially increased. Milton Stauffer, editor of the 
survey, surmised: "It is therefore evident that new workers 
from the West went largely into the old stations."~"'"" 
There was a correlation between concentration of 
missionary effort and success in winning converts. 
Guangdong, Shandong, and Fujian had the highest number of 
missionary "residential centers." This was where the 
highest numbers of Chinese Christians lived. Seven coastal 
provinces (including these three) contained 65 percent of 
the missionaries, 65 percent of the Chinese evangelists, 
and 65 percent of the Chinese medical staff. The Christian 
educational effort also was concentrated in the seven 
coastal provinces with 63 percent of lower primary students 
and 77 percent of middle school students located there. 
The survey counted 71 percent of Chinese Christians in 
these seven provinces.~7 Missionaries had confined their 
work to less than half of China's provinces. 
The Laymen's Foreign Mission Inquiry conducted a 
similar survey of China missions in 1930-1931. Despite the 
growing awareness among missionaries that they had neglec-
ted rural China, little had changed since 1922. The 
Laymen's survey found 60 percent of the missionaries 
working in the coastal provinces. Another 25 percent were 
concentrated in the central provinces of the lower Chang 
Jiang valley. In north China there was only one Christian 
for. every three hundred families or fifteen hundred people. 
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These converts were widely scattered as 80 percent of the 
villages had four or fewer Christians and 58 percent of the 
villages had only one or two. The Inquiry concluded that 
"the starting of work where little or none at all exists 
obviously constitutes a special problem of evangel-
i z at ion . 11 ~"1 ;;:1 
Some missionaries and Chinese Christians criticized 
this failure to meet the needs of the rural masses. Tai 
Ping Heng faulted the missionaries in 1921 for ~on~entrat­
ing their efforts in urban areas and large institutions.~9 -
In 1924 K.T. Chung realized that all Christian work was 
in "strategic centers" and "any country work done is 
generally undertaken by persons not needed in the cities." 
Chung suggested that mission money and evangelists be 
redistributed to benefit the villages. 40 The editor of the 
Educational Review admitted in 1926 that "heretofore the 
efforts of those who work for the progress of the country 
have been almost entirely confined to the cities and 
towns. 114 :L 
The secondary literature agrees that the missionaries 
generally neglected rural China. Kenneth Latourette 
believes that before the 1922 survey, missionaries directed 
little attention to the problems of the rural areas. After 
the survey, "only a beginning had been made, however, 
before th'e disorders of 1925, 1926, and 1927 supervened. 11 ''•· 1"·; 
James Thomson studied the involvement of missionaries 
in the New Life Movement during the Nanjing decade. He 
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maintains that missionary efforts at rural reconstruction 
failed because many Chinese identified them with the KMT 
·government. The rural policies of the KMT did not solve 
the critical problems of land tenure, land tax, or credit 
for farmers. The New Life Movement failed to win the 
support of most Chinese intellectuals because it adopted 
neo-Confucianism as an ideological base. The alienation of 
both farmers and intellectuals was fatal for the KMT. 
Thomson concludes that the missionaries' association with 
the New Life Movement was futile because "the NLM played no 
part whatsoever in the thinking of China's you th. 11 •···~"1 
Paul Varg criticizes the missionaries for not present-
ing viable solutions to the problems of rural Chinese. He 
believes "Christiani.ty made itself irrelevant by failing to 
include the community, and, in turn, the community never 
embraced the esoteric Christian enterprise." The mission-
aries did not overcome the problem of making the institu-
tion of the church feasible in rural China or making 
Christianity an integral part of Chinese life. \)arg 
reports a statistical survey in 1936 found ''the rural 
church had made little significant progress toward the 
stated objective of becoming a driving force and shaping 
i n f 1 u enc e i n the r econ st r u c t i on of r u r a 1 Ch i n a . " '"•· "'" 
• 0 
William Brown, although complimentary of the attempts 
the missionaries made at rural reconstruction, finds 
several faults with the programs. Work in agricultural 
education failed because of poor personnel policies. 
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Workers were not properly trained and were usually sta-
tioned in isolated areas where failure led to poor morale. 
Chinese Christians who attended colleges and seminaries 
wanted lucrative jobs in the cities and would ncit serve in 
rural areas. The theological seminaries did not develop 
training programs in rural work and paid little attention 
to rural problems. 4~ 
A major problem was the poverty of the peasants. 
Survey's conducted in 1930 and 1936 found that to support a 
minister, rural churches would need an average membership 
of 200 to 400 Chinese. The actual size of the churches 
ranged from forty-five to eighty-three. Another problem 
was the continued emphasis on evangelization in rural 
China. Brown believes practical social service work should 
have replaced this as the main effort of rural missions in 
the 1930s. 46 
In her study of American Board missionaries, Janet 
Heininger is more favorable towards the missionaries' 
attempts at rural reconstruction. She uses the example of 
two American Board missionaries, Hugh and Mabel Hubbard, 
who worked in rural reconstruction in the 1930s. At Fan 
village, in Hubei province, the Hubbards implemented an 
experimental program for making Christianity indigenous to 
rural China. The Hubbards' work was service-oriented and 
did not include proselytizing. Complete cooperation was 
sought from the Chinese on all questions. The Hubbards 
lived like the villagers and concentrated their efforts on 
education, disease prevention, and improving farming 
techniques. '·•· 7 
Heininger maintains that "rural reconstruction had the 
potential for revolutionizing the mission movement." To be 
successful, missionaries would have had to implement it on 
a much larger scale. This did not occur because mission-
aries viewed the work at Fan village as only experimental. 
World War II and the Japanese invasion also disrupted the 
rural reconstruction projects. In addition, Heininger 
concludes, the majority of American Board missionaries did 
not want to revolutionize their work and create indigenous 
Christianity. This would have ended the missions. 4~ 
The Missionary Enterprise 
Historians offer differing interpretations of the 
missionary enterprise in China. Many are critical of the 
missionaries' efforts to "save" China; others are more 
positive in their evaluations. The majority of scholars 
stress the significance of Christianity in China in the 
development of all aspects of Sino-American relations. 
Hu Shih was a contemporary of the missionaries in the 
1920s and provides a Chinese intellectual's interpretation 
of the missionaries' problems. Hu credits Christianity for 
influencing much needed social reforms in China. Mission-
aries also helped the Chinese recognize the need to 
modernize their country. The opposition to Christianity 
combined rationalism from traditional Chinese philosophy 
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with new scientific knowledge from the West "to become a 
truly formidable safeguard." Having rejected Christianity 
himself, Hu believes the whole world will one day recognize 
"that Young China was not far wrong in offering some 
opposition to a religion which fought religious wars and 
persecuted science. "<+''i' 
Kenneth Latourette presents an interpretation of this 
period from the Christian point of view. He believes 
Christianity affected Chinese society by contributing to 
the "dissolution of the older culture.·" This would have 
occurred without the influence of Christianity but the work 
of the missionaries inc~eased the beneficial aspects of the 
"dissolution." The missionary enterprise had defects yet 
it tried to bring the best of the Occident to China.~0 
Latourette places the origins of the problems of the 
1920s in the characteristics of mission expansion during 
the preceding decades. Between 1900 and World War I, 
Protestant missionaries greatly expanded the Christian 
institutions in China. The church buildings, schools, 
hospitals, and missionary residences were far larger than 
Chinese Christians could eVer hope to support. L~tourette 
believes this expansion was flawed because it postponed 
se 1 f-suppor-t. It also developed a Western bureaucracy that 
Chinese were uncomfortable with and it distracted both 
missionaries and Chinese from the primary function of 
evangelism. Latourette explains that with these weaknesses 
"Christianity might suffer severely and even disappear 
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before a strong wave of nationalism."r-s:i. 
On the issues of devolution and indigenous Chris-
tianity, Latourette is more critical. He believes the 
inflexibility of some missionaries ''is a serious and un-
necessary handic~p for it insi~ts upon more of a disloca-
tion of the older culture than is essential." The inabil-
ity of missionaries to give up Western forms "burdens 
Christianity with an enormous amount of baggage that is 
Graeco-Roman, Russian, British, German, or American."~;~;.~ On 
the results of devolution, Latourette admits that "with all 
the progress towards an independent Chinese Church, the 
goal was still far from being reached." Despite these 
faults, Latourette concludes that Christianity, in 1928, 
"had a better chance of surviving and making a permanent 
impression than at any time during its presence in 
John Fairbank argues that missionaries contributed to 
the revolutionary process in modern China. As the Qing 
dynasty ended, many Chinese rejected Confucian traditional-
ism for other ideologies. Interaction between foreigners 
and the majority of Chinese at that time was primarily 
through missionaries and their followers. Christian 
educational institutions and missionary publications 
influenced young Chinese intellectuals. Through them 
Christianity contributed to China's nationalism. Although 
some Chinese Christians and missionaries attempted a 
spiritual regeneration of Chinese society, the issues of 
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the 1920s revealed the limitations of this approach. 
Because Christianity was nonpolitical and nonrevolu-
tionary, most Chinese intellectuals rejected it in favor of 
more militant ideals. Missionaries continued their 
traditional activities while Chinese nationalism became 
more radical. In the 1930s and 1940s, Chinese viewed 
missionaries as defenders of KMT conservatism. They were 
"no longer apostles of China's transformation but more 
often worried bystanders."ei4 Fairbank concludes that 
Chinese nationalism achieved fulfillment by "rejecting the 
Christian West in favor of that minor nineteenth-century 
western Christi an heresy, Marx i sm-Leni ni sm. "~5 ~~' 
The writings of Paul Varg represent a critical and 
thorough analysis of the missionary enterprise in China. 
Varg believes Americans became more concerned about China's 
future as a nation when the missionary goal became the 
regeneration of Chinese society. This concern combined 
with expanding American nationalism in the late nineteenth 
century resulted in the belief that the United States c~uld 
influence the changes occurring there. China could enter 
the modern world as a "Christian" democracy and ally of the 
United States or it could be something else and an enemy. 
Through this process, China missions became an aspect of 
United States national interests.~• 
Missionaries did not realize until 1924 the danger of 
their historical reliance on treaty privileges. Varg 
criticizes this delayed recognition citing the demands of 
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the Chinese delegates at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 
and the Washington Conference in 1922 as signals of 
increasing Chinese nationalism. He believes the mission-
aries' "myopic cqncern with the daily routine of their 
mission stations, and their theological bent" were respons-
ible for this failure. 57 Although the missionaries and 
their home boards supported treaty revision, they did not 
significantly influence United States policy during this 
period.~.'ie 
Missionaries and diplomats in China responded to 
Chinese nationalism similarly. Both showed sympathy and 
understanding for the Chinese point of view. Yet they 
deplored the violence and extreme anti-foreignism that 
characterized the movement. Varg maintains the "response 
of both missionaries and American government officials 
represented something deeper." They experienced "a common 
inability to share the Chinese view that the extreme price 
paid to achieve Chinese nationalist goals was not too 
great."!'$"">' 
Varg finds no cqnsensus among the missionaries on 
Chiang Kai~sh~k and the KMT during the Nanjing decade. 
Many were pessimistic about the ability of the KMT to solve 
China's problems. Most missionaries supported Chiang as 
the lesser of two evils. Some, however, correctly assessed 
the weaknesses of the KMT. They perceived "its determina-
tion to preserve one-party rule, its failure to implement 
many of the social aspects of its program, and its suscep-
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tibility to corruption."'"' 0 
The missionaries were responsible for several failures 
in their campaign to save China. They portrayed the worst 
of Chinese life to the home churches in order to generate 
continuing support. This developed American feelings of 
paternalism and altruism towards the Chinese. These 
attitudes confused the issues of Sino-American relations 
during the Christian century. Americans believed that 
their philanthropic activities in China, including schools 
and hospitals, were the basis for permanent friendly 
relations between the two countries. When these became the 
targets of Chinese nationalism, Americans felt betrayed. 61 
Varg believes the missionaries met no generally 
recognized needs in China. They ignored the problem of 
Chinese poverty. 
for the Chinese. 
This became a primary target of reform 
But "American moral idealism prevented 
missionaries from recognizing Chinese needs of economic 
rehabilitation and equal status among nations. 11 <-"'*i 
In the 1920s, the Chinese passionately searched for 
solutions to their economic and sovereignty problems. The 
majority of missionaries "side-stepped political and 
economic issues and sought to convince the Chinese that 
their problems were spiritual." At the close of the 
Christian century, American nationalism and Chinese 
nationalism overcame the. best aspects of Christian idealism 
and Confucian humanism. Christianity failed because it was 
not an economic and political doctrine--Marxism was. 63 
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A balanced interpretation includes an appreciation of 
the sacrifices and ideals of the missionaries. Many 
American men and women gave the most productive years of 
their lives for a cause they fervently believed was good. 
Better educated Chinese children, better health care, and 
better treatment of Chinese women are among their many 
accomplishments. As is the case in all human endeavors, 
misconceptions and missed opportunities plagued the 
missionary enterprise. Many Christian workers were short-
sighted and made foolish mistakes. Yet many of the 
problems they confronted were beyond their power to remedy. 
Above all else, the missionaries were representatives of 
their nation, their culture, and their religion. The 
history of their interaction with the Chinese in an often 
hostile environment clarifies much that is unique in the 
American character. 
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